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ARTICLES
VIRTUE AND ADVICE:
SOCRATIC PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYER
INDEPENDENCE AND MORAL COUNSELING
OF CLIENTS
By: Michael S. McGinniss†
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the ethical and moral responsibilities of lawyers in
their role as advisors to clients, with continual reference to the Greek philoso-
pher Socrates.*  Although Socrates was not a lawyer, he was an “advisor,”
who lived a life committed to engaging in dialogue about virtue and its mean-
ing and, at times, about the law and one’s duties in relation to the law.  Ac-
cording to Rule 2.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, when
representing clients and acting as advisors, lawyers are expected to “exercise
independent professional judgment” and “render candid advice,” which in-
cludes authority to counsel clients on moral considerations relevant to their
legal situation.  Socrates was a paradigm of “independence” and, although his
speech was often bristling with irony, he was also persistently “candid” with
his dialogue partners as they pursued the truth about moral questions.  His life
and teachings, and his courage in adhering to the principles that defined him,
offer valuable insights for lawyers as they form their professional identities
and serve as advisors to their clients.
Part I of this Article will offer an overview and perspective on lawyers as
independent advisors, first by closely examining Rule 2.1 and its meaning.  It
will then further explore moral independence in a legal context by reflecting
on Socrates, with particular attention to his trial and its aftermath, but also
considering Socrates as portrayed in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard.
Part II will review several frameworks legal ethicists have developed to de-
scribe the relationship of advising lawyers and their clients, and propose the
moral ideal of the “trustworthy neighbor” for lawyers serving clients in the
advising role. Finally, Part III will consider some lessons derived from the
teachings of Socrates for lawyer-advisors who are engaged in moral dialogue
with their clients.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Socrates went around Athens telling law teachers and law students
that their highest concern should be to be good people.  He said
their next and consequent concern should be to show the citizens of
Athens how to be good people.  For Socrates, as for virtually all of
the giants of classical moral philosophy and much of Hebraic moral
theology, ethical discussion is discussion about being good persons
and helping others to be good persons.  When moral philosophy
talks about Aristotle’s “man of practical wisdom,” or when litera-
ture tells us about heroes in our culture, or when the religious tradi-
tion tells us about saints; when we talk about paragons, role models,
professional exemplars . . . it is the good person we are talking
about.1
1. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETH-
ICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 13–14 (1991) [hereinafter SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAW-
YERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES] (footnote omitted).  Shaffer uses the term “Hebraic”
rather than “Judeo-Christian” to emphasize the “single theological ethical tradition”
involved, as “[t]he ethics of Jesus are the ethics of the Jews.” Id. at 13 n.1.
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The lawyer is not simply a technician; nor is she a moral arbiter. As
legal advisers, lawyers are partners in a dialogue that is brimming
with moral significance, whether they acknowledge the significance or
not.  Ignoring the potential for interpersonal moral engagement in
the course of an attorney’s work comes at a significant cost.  To the
extent that an attorney approaches the client as a bundle of legal
interests to be maximized, the client’s true interests may often re-
main out of view and unprotected.2
In the Preamble, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(“Rules”) declare “a lawyer is . . . guided by personal conscience.”3
An evocative remnant of the more insistently aspirational 1908 ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics,4 the declarative “is” suggests the active
exercise of conscience in representing clients not only is something a
lawyer may do or should do,5 but also is essential to what it means to
be “a lawyer.”  As manifested in the formation, reformation, and pres-
ervation of a person’s character, personal conscience is a core element
of the lawyer’s properly developed professional identity.6  And be-
cause conscience is personal to the lawyer, rather than a normative
standard enforced within the legal community, it is a wellspring of in-
dependence for a lawyer willing to take a moral stand, even when
others will not.
The Rules establish boundary-point standards of conduct for law-
yers, but also leave ample room for the lawyer to ask and decide, in
first-personal terms: Who am I, and who will I become, as a person
and as a professional?7  And how am I—and how should I be—im-
2. ROBERT K. VISCHER, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LE-
GAL PRACTICE: LESSONS IN LOVE AND JUSTICE 11–12 (2013) [hereinafter VISCHER,
MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE] (emphasis added).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 7 (2013).
4. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) (stating that a lawyer “must obey
his own conscience and not that of the client”); see also id. Canon 32 (stating that a
lawyer “advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his client when
he renders service and gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his under-
taking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law”).
5. Cf., e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 4–6 (2013) (describing
actions a lawyer “should” take relating to a variety of professional responsibilities).
6. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Professional Identity and the Contours of Pru-
dence, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 46, 61 (2006) (observing that “lawyers who bring con-
science to bear on their professional identities can help expand and enrich the
common good by challenging the presumptions of the governing legal paradigm,
whether by critically engaging the substance of the positive law or the objectives that
the client wishes to pursue through the positive law”).
7. See Michael S. McGinniss, Virtue Ethics, Earnestness, and the Deciding Law-
yer: Human Flourishing in a Legal Community, 87 N.D. L. REV. 19, 45–50 (2011); see
also ANTHONY RUDD, KIERKEGAARD AND THE LIMITS OF THE ETHICAL 59 (1993)
[hereinafter RUDD, LIMITS OF THE ETHICAL] (“The fundamental question in ethics is:
How shall I live? But this is a question that is necessarily asked from the first personal
standpoint, that is, from the standpoint not of an abstract subject, but of a real indi-
vidual person . . . .”).
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pacting the lives of my clients and others through my words and ac-
tions as a professional?  In grappling with these questions at the
beginning and throughout the course of a professional life, the decid-
ing lawyer may be guided by moral principles based on religious con-
victions, philosophical reflections, or a combination of the two.8
Ideally, the lawyer’s deliberation about those principles and how they
apply in the lawyer’s practice will constitute an ongoing process of
subjective9 self-definition, developing the meaning of the terms
through which to understand individual professional identity and the
relational obligations to clients and others.10
The Greek philosopher Socrates,11 as portrayed in the writings of
his student Plato,12 relished the search for understanding—including
8. See Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decision-
making, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 26 (1997) (observing that “because of the po-
rous nature of the professional norms [such as the Rules], one’s general philosophical
approach to the practice of law may be determined by one’s personal moral or relig-
ious understandings”); see also, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN
AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981) [hereinafter SHAFFER, ON BEING A
CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER]; VISCHER, MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2;
Samuel J. Levine, Reflections on the Practice of Law as a Religious Calling, From a
Perspective of Jewish Law and Ethics, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 411 (2005).
9. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the concept of “subjectivity” as developed in
the works of Søren Kierkegaard) and Part II.C (discussing Robert K. Vischer’s treat-
ment of lawyers and clients as moral subjects); see also McGinniss, supra note 7, at
41–42, 44 (on Kierkegaard’s ethics of decision, including concepts of “subjective
knowledge” and “passionate reason”).
10. Psychologist Robert Kegan has identified five stages of “professional ethical
identity development,” the fourth of which is the “self-defining professional.”  Verna
E. Monson & Neil W. Hamilton, Entering Law Students’ Conceptions of Ethical Pro-
fessional Identity and the Role of the Lawyer in Society, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 385, 388
(2011) (citing ROBERT KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS: THE MENTAL DEMANDS OF
MODERN LIFE (1994); ROBERT KEGAN & LISA LAHEY, IMMUNITY TO CHANGE: HOW
TO OVERCOME IT AND UNLOCK THE POTENTIAL IN YOURSELF AND YOUR ORGANI-
ZATION (2009)).  This fourth stage is “[c]haracterized by self-reflection, the ability to
hold opposing ideas, and respect diversity of thought or ideology.  Has identified key
elements of life purpose or values. Can independently judge the influences from close
others or authorities, and adhere to one’s inner values and ways of making sense of
one’s experiences.” Id. (emphasis added).  Kegan regards achievement of this fourth
stage—also called the “Self-Authoring Mind”—as being “essential for success in de-
manding professional roles or occupations.” Id. The fifth and final stage, which
Kegan calls the “Humanist,” is “[c]haracterized by recognition of the limits of self-
defined values and commitments.  Can transform the self to become more fully pre-
sent and open to others, resulting in more authentic, effective relationships.  Stage 5
individuals recognize the interdependence of all persons and systems.” Id. at 388 (em-
phasis added).  This Article will consider the significance for lawyers to be found in
reconciling aspects of independence and interdependence in the moral counseling of
clients. See infra Part III.C.
11. Socrates was born in 470 B.C. and died in 399 B.C. PAUL JOHNSON, SOCRA-
TES: A MAN FOR OUR TIMES 7, 154 (2011).
12. Socrates himself “wrote nothing,” and “his life and ideas are known to us
through direct accounts” either by his contemporaries (specifically, the playwright Ar-
istophanes) or his pupils Xenophon and Plato.  Louis-André Dorion, The Rise and
Fall of the Socratic Problem, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO SOCRATES 1, 1
(Donald R. Morrison ed., 2011).  The “Socratic problem” is “the historical and meth-
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of one’s self—through the defining of words and the concepts the
words express.13  He regularly engaged in spirited dialogues with his
fellow Athenians to explore the meaning of word-concepts such as
“justice,”14 “wisdom,”15 “courage,”16 and “temperance.”17  These
word-concepts exemplify the qualities of character and principles of
ethical life that may be broadly described as “virtues.”18
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Plato’s student Aristotle further exam-
ines the nature of the virtues, seeking to answer the question: “[W]hat
is the good life for man?”19  For Aristotle, the ultimate “telos,” or
supreme good, for human beings is eudaimonia, which is often trans-
lated from the Greek as “flourishing.”20  In Aristotle’s moral philoso-
phy, the virtues are “qualities the possession of which will enable an
individual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of which will frustrate
his movement toward that telos.”21  Among the moral virtues Aris-
odological problem that historians confront when they attempt to reconstruct the
philosophical Socrates.” Id. For purposes of this Article, I will generally rely on
Plato’s account of the teachings of Socrates. But cf. infra note 311 (citing scholars
skeptical of Plato’s account of Socrates in various dialogues).
13. See generally THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1961).  All page numbers to Plato’s
dialogues in this Article refer to THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO.  For ease of
reference to other volumes and translations, I have also provided parallel citations to
the standard Stephanus pagination.
14. See PLATO, Republic, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 575,
580 (331c-e) (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Paul Shorey trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1961) [hereinafter Republic].
15. See PLATO, Socrates’ Defense (Apology), reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIA-
LOGUES OF PLATO 3, 7–9 (20e-23c) (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Hugh
Tredennick trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1961) [hereinafter Apology].
16. See PLATO, Laches, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 123,
134 (190d-e) (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1961).
17. See PLATO, Charmides, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO
308 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Benjamin Jowett trans., Princeton
Univ. Press 1961).
18. In the dialogue Meno, Socrates examines the questions of what “virtue” is, and
whether it can be taught. See PLATO, Meno, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIA-
LOGUES OF PLATO 353, 354–55 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., W. K. C.
Guthrie trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1961) [hereinafter Meno].
19. JONATHAN LEAR, ARISTOTLE: THE DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND 154 (1988).  For
additional discussion of Aristotle’s “virtue ethics,” including their further develop-
ment by Thomas Aquinas and contemporary applications, see McGinniss, supra note
7, at 30–34.
20. See McGinniss, supra note 7, at 31; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HIS-
TORY OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 59 (2d ed. 1998); see also R. Michael Cassidy, Character
and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to
“Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 644 n.49 (2006) (identifying other possi-
ble translations of eudaimonia as “happiness” or “becoming an excellent human
being”).
21. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 148 (3d ed. 2007).
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totle identifies are justice, courage, and honesty,22 and among the in-
tellectual virtues is phronēsis, usually translated as “practical
wisdom.”23  Despite their significant differences,24 for both Socrates
and Aristotle the purpose of ethical inquiry is to understand goodness,
so that one is able to become a good person and to act as a good
person should.25
Although Socrates was not a lawyer, he was an “advisor,” about
virtue and its meaning and, at times, about the law and one’s duties in
relation to the law.26  According to Rule 2.1, when representing clients
and acting as advisors, lawyers are expected to “exercise independent
professional judgment” and “render candid advice.”27  Socrates was a
paradigm of “independence” and, although his speech was often bris-
tling with irony,28 he was also persistently “candid” with his dialogue
partners as they pursued the truth about moral questions.29  His life
and teachings, and his courage in adhering to the principles that de-
fined him, offer valuable insights for lawyers as they form their profes-
sional identities and serve as advisors to their clients.
Part I of this Article will offer an overview and perspective on law-
yers as independent advisors, first by closely examining Rule 2.1 and
its meaning.  It will then further explore moral independence in a legal
context by reflecting on Socrates, with particular attention to his trial
and its aftermath, but also considering Socrates as portrayed in the
philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard. Part II will review several
frameworks legal ethicists have developed to describe the relationship
of advising lawyers and their clients, and propose the moral ideal of
the “trustworthy neighbor” for lawyers serving clients in the advising
role.  Finally, Part III will consider some lessons derived from the
22. See Cassidy, supra note 20, at 647–49 (summarizing Aristotle’s account of the
virtues of “justice,” “courage,” and “honesty”).
23. Id. at 649 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. VI, ch. 5, at 179–80
(Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002)).
24. See, e.g., ANTHONY RUDD, SELF, NARRATIVE, & VALUE: A KIERKEGAAR-
DIAN APPROACH 34–35 (2012) [hereinafter RUDD, SELF, NARRATIVE, & VALUE]
(comparing and contrasting Plato’s concepts of virtue and ethical teleology with
Aristotle’s).
25. Id. at 29 (noting that “the main Greek philosophical traditions insisted that, as
rational beings, it is part of our nature to realize our telos through our own conscious
recognition of what is good, and by developing our characters accordingly”).
26. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Crito).
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013).
28. See generally GREGORY VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSO-
PHER 21–44 (1991) [hereinafter VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSO-
PHER] (explaining and providing examples of the use of irony in the Socratic
dialogues).
29. “[F]rankness” (candor) is one of the three Socratic conditions for genuine dia-
logue on matters of consequence, along with “knowledge” (intelligence) and “good
will.” See PLATO, Gorgias, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 229,
269 (478a) (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., W. D. Woodhead trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1961) [hereinafter Gorgias]; see also infra Part IV.C (discussing
Socratic candor).
2013] VIRTUE AND ADVICE 7
teachings of Socrates for lawyer-advisors who are engaged in moral
dialogue with their clients.
II. LAWYERS AS INDEPENDENT ADVISORS
Professional independence has long been an important and versatile
theme for understanding the role of lawyers in society,30 and as such it
has been the subject of much scholarly discussion and analysis.31  In
the Rules, the words “independent” or “independence” appear in five
contexts relating to the professional work of an individual lawyer.32
Three of these are found in Rule 1.8(f), on a lawyer accepting com-
pensation for representing a client from someone other than the cli-
ent;33 the comments to Rule 1.7 on concurrent conflicts of interest;34
and the heading (“Professional Independence of a Lawyer”) and com-
ments to Rule 5.4, concerning limitations on a lawyer’s relationships
with non-lawyers.35
The fourth reference to “independence” occurs in the comment on
Rule 1.2(b) (“Independence from a Client’s Views or Activities”).36
Rule 1.2(b) is a non-directive “rule” explaining the “scope” of a law-
yer’s relationship with clients, stating “[a] lawyer’s representation of a
30. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L.
REV. 1 (1988).  Gordon’s seminal work on lawyer independence offers several “types”
of independence as examples: (1) corporate independence, i.e., “the bar’s freedom to
regulate its own practices, and its freedom from outside regulation”; (2) working inde-
pendence, i.e., “a large degree of discretion, of autonomy from outside direction, in
determining the conditions of one’s work”; and (3) political independence, i.e., the
ability “to assert and pursue client interests free of external controls, especially con-
trols imposed by state officials,” and, as a limitation on client loyalty, the idea that “a
part of the lawyer’s professional persona must be set aside for dedication to public
purposes.” Id. at 6–7, 10, 13.
31. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence,
42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (drawing on identity theory from social psychology to
explain “why certain situations may prompt lawyers to deviate from a neutral per-
spective more often than others and how that lack of neutrality prevents the lawyers
from offering fully independent advice to their clients”).
32. Cf., e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (2013) (addressing the
need for the involvement of, or advice about the involvement of, “independent legal
counsel” for a client concerning legal malpractice issues).
33. Id. R. 1.8(f) (providing “[a] lawyer shall not accept compensation for repre-
senting a client from one other than the client unless,” among other limitations,
“there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or
with the client-lawyer relationship”) (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7, cmt. 8 (observing that the “critical questions” in deciding
whether disclosure of a concurrent conflict of interest and consent are required “are
the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it
will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in con-
sidering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued
on behalf of the client”).
35. Id. R. 5.4; see generally Lawrence J. Fox, Old Wine in New Bottles: Preserving
Professional Independence, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 971 (1999) (discussing the significance
of a lawyer’s independence under Rule 5.4 in preserving and upholding the “core
values” of the legal profession).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2013).
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client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute
an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral
views or activities.”37  Closely related to Rule 1.2(b)’s distancing of
lawyers from their clients is a legal ethics concept variously described
as the “moral independence theory”38 or the principle of “nonac-
countability.”39  A deep-seated yet controversial precept of our legal
system, this principle asserts lawyers “are not morally accountable for
who their clients are, what their clients have done, or what [they] will
do for their clients as long as it is within the bounds of the law.”40  In
this sense, the lawyer is deemed to be morally independent from the
client.  Although this Rule is not a focus of this Article, the principle
of nonaccountability, including its shortcomings, has important impli-
cations for lawyers acting in the advising role.41
The fifth Rules reference to an individual lawyer’s “independence”
is found in Rule 2.1 (“Advisor”), which addresses a lawyer’s profes-
sional responsibilities in advising clients.  Specifically, in its first sen-
tence, it provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid ad-
vice.”42  In its second sentence, it provides that “[i]n rendering advice,
a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to
the client’s situation.”43  Thus, as expressed in this Rule, the advising
lawyer’s independence and candor are mandatory (“shall”), but the
lawyer’s counseling on moral considerations is discretionary (“may”).
37. Id. R. 1.2(b).
38. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 507–08 (1994) (describing the “moral indepen-
dence” theory as the principle that “[a]lthough lawyers’ actions may assist clients’
conduct or assist clients in escaping consequences of their conduct, the clients are the
only ones responsible”).
39. See Judith A. McMorrow & Luke M. Scheuer, The Moral Responsibility of the
Corporate Lawyer, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 275, 276 (2011).
40. Id. at 276–77; see also Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accounta-
bility of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 674 (1978) (arguing that “whatever the validity
of the Principle of Nonaccountability for advocates, its legitimacy rests on the particu-
lar structures and functions of the adversary system, and that the circumstances of
nonadvocate lawyers require a different predicate for analysis of their professionalism
and accountability”); McMorrow & Scheuer, supra note 39, at 308 (“With each client
a lawyer represents, the lawyer must determine whether the justification for nonac-
countability applies to his or her client’s representation and must be able to respond
with a forceful argument for the representation when questioned.”).
41. See infra Part III.A (discussing the “standard conception of the lawyer’s
role”).  This Article will develop a distinct concept of “moral independence,” which,
instead of being based on an (alleged) freedom from moral responsibility, will de-
scribe a quality of a lawyer who is willing to act on moral principle in the advising role
in serving the client. See infra Parts II.C & III.C.
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013) (emphasis added).
43. Id.
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A. Lawyers Must Be Independent from Whom, and Why?
As a lawyer’s independence in the exercise of “professional judg-
ment” and rendering of “candid advice” is mandatory under Rule 2.1,
it is critically important to ask these questions: When acting as an ad-
visor, from whom must a lawyer be independent under the Rule, and
why?
Kevin H. Michels has closely examined the text and history of Rule
2.1 and considered its operation in relation to the Rules as a whole,44
including Rule 1.2, which addresses the scope of representation and
allocation of authority between client and lawyer.45  Lawyers must
“abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the repre-
sentation,”46 and must “reasonably consult” with the client about the
“means” to be employed in achieving them.47  These obligations,
along with other duties set out in the Rules, create what is in most
substantive respects a “principal-agent relationship” between the cli-
ent (principal) and the lawyer (agent).48  The pervasiveness of these
agency principles has led some courts, relying on Rule 2.1, to conflate
its requirements with the duty of loyalty (e.g., to avoid conflicts of
interest when providing legal advice),49 or, by focusing on the “candid
advice” provision, to narrowly interpret the Rule as merely “designed
to ensure that the client receives the best possible advice with respect
to her options before making a decision.”50
These agency-based interpretations of Rule 2.1 are ultimately un-
persuasive.  As Michels observes, the loyalty and quality-of-represen-
tation concerns are already addressed in other Rule provisions,
making Rule 2.1 redundant if the agency approach is correct.51  What
44. See Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Stan-
dard, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 85 (2010).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2013).
46. Id. R. 1.2(a).
47. Id. R. 1.4(a)(2).
48. See Michels, supra note 44, at 92–96 (discussing the “principal-agent relation-
ship” between client and lawyer under the Rules and the common law, and the “cli-
ent-autonomy vision” that “characterizes much of the law governing lawyers”).  In
carrying out these duties, these Rules do reserve some authority to the lawyer, includ-
ing, with reasonable consultation, the authority to exercise some discretion as to the
specific means employed to accomplish the client’s objectives. See also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 1.4(a)(2) (2013); McGinniss, supra note 7, at
25–27 (discussing the interrelationship between a lawyer’s “authority” and “agency”
in representing a client, and the “temptations” accompanying them).
49. See Michels, supra note 44, at 99 & n.73 (citing, e.g., Scheffler v. Adams &
Reese, LLP, 950 So. 2d 641, 651 (La. 2007)). Writing in 2010, Michels also notes that
“the lawyer-independence language of Rule 2.1 has been cited in fewer than forty
reported decisions in the state and federal courts, often as dicta or as additional au-
thority rather than as the central theory in the case.” Id. at 97 n.61.
50. Id. at 97–98 (citing, e.g., In re Count Liberty, LLC, 370 B.R. 259, 281–83
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007)).
51. Id. at 98–99 (noting that Rules 1.1 and 1.4 already require competent repre-
sentation and reasonable communication with clients, and Rules 1.7 and 1.8 govern
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these flawed interpretations have in common is a failure to recognize
that the Rule’s standard of “independent professional judgment,”52
and the “candid advice” expected to flow from it, constitute a “depar-
ture” from the otherwise prevalent “agency conception of lawyer-
ing.”53  In essence, the Rule requires the lawyer to exercise
professional judgment independently from the client, and to render
candid advice to the client based on that judgment.  In this respect, the
role adopted by the advising lawyer under the Rule is one of a verbal
safeguard standing between the client and the potential impact of the
client’s actions on third-party or societal interests, and speaking out as
necessary and proper to protect interests beyond the client’s alone.54
Additional support for this understanding of “independence” is
found in the work of David Luban,55 who has explained how effec-
tively Rule 2.1 works in tandem with Rule 1.6’s protections of confi-
dential information relating to representation of a client.56  According
to Luban, Rule 2.1 resolves a longstanding problem in legal ethics,
which is justifying confidentiality in light of its social costs.57  Rule 1.6
encourages a client to “seek legal assistance and to communicate fully
and frankly with the lawyer,” and receiving this information provides
the lawyer with the opportunity “to advise the client to refrain from
wrongful conduct.”58  The conditions imposed by Rule 2.1 are de-
conflicts of interest, and observing that “[t]he care that attended the drafting of the
Model Rules makes redundancy unlikely”).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013) (emphasis added).
53. Michels, supra note 44, at 97, 99–100.
54. See id. at 99–100 (“If we are to identify the core interest served by Rule 2.1, we
need to look beyond client interests—the preoccupation of the agency conception of
lawyering.”); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1317, 1330 (2006) (“As gatekeepers in imperfect legal processes, lawyers have obliga-
tions that transcend those owed to any particular client. Honesty, trust, and fairness
are collective goods; neither legal nor market systems can function effectively if law-
yers assume no social responsibility for the consequences of their counseling role.”).
55. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 153–57
(2007).
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013) (providing, with exceptions,
that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a cli-
ent”); see Michels, supra note 44, at 100 (citing LUBAN, supra note 55, at 154).
57. Michels, supra note 44, at 100–01 (citing LUBAN, supra note 55, at 156).  As
Luban explains, confidentiality “is a good bet for society only because we can count
on lawyers to give good advice on compliance (and on clients to take that advice).  If
the lawyer doesn’t give independent, candid advice, this entire argument, and indeed
the whole edifice of confidentiality, comes tumbling down.” LUBAN, supra note 55, at
156.
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2013).  Michels states he is
confining his understanding of the “wrongful conduct” Rule 2.1 “seeks to prevent to
‘criminal or fraudulent’” conduct.  Michels, supra note 44, at 102 (quoting MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d)).  Although this approach is a defensible one
for purposes of Rule 2.1’s disciplinary enforcement, see id. at 128–30, from the per-
spective of legal ethics and morally responsible lawyering, “wrongful conduct” should
be understood more broadly to include actions or inactions of a client that are lawful
but are nevertheless questionable for other reasons. See also infra Part II.B.2 (dis-
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signed to ensure that the lawyer actually does this, and does so accu-
rately and thoroughly, thereby making it more likely the client will
actually refrain from the conduct in question.59  Under this conception
of Rule 2.1, the advising lawyer bears the responsibility to communi-
cate to the client not only for the client’s sake, but also for the sake of
the law and the public interest.  In dynamic tension with Rule 1.2(b),
Rule 2.1 expresses a principle of accountability.60  As Luban has put
it, “[w]ithout independence and candor, the rules would do little more
than screen conspiracies, or permit clients and lawyers to play respon-
sibility games—the client insisting that the lawyer had approved his
actions and the lawyer insisting that he was simply doing what the
client asked.”61
B. The Fruits of Independence in the Advising Role
With an understanding that Rule 2.1 insists on a lawyer’s exercising
independence from the client, and does so in order to create a public-
interest-based departure from the agency-based relations of lawyer
and client, it becomes clear the lawyer may face substantial challenges
in ethically fulfilling the advising role.62  Advising decisions may cre-
ate moments of great risk for all involved: lawyer, client, and society.63
cussing the value of a robust conception of “candor” in relation to non-legal consider-
ations, including moral ones).
59. Michels, supra note 44, at 101.
60. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 1.2(b) and the
principle of nonaccountability).
61. LUBAN, supra note 55, at 155.  Luban, in support of his concept of “moral
activism” for lawyers, has gone so far as to compare a lawyer’s ethical duty of inde-
pendence in advising clients to a judge’s ethical duty of impartiality in adjudication:
“[T]he rules of ethics require lawyers to offer independent, candid advice, not advo-
cacy for a position. . . . In other words, lawyers in the advisor’s role lie under the same
obligation of impartiality that judges do.” Id. at 154.  Luban is skeptical, however,
that practicing lawyers usually live up to the demanding standards he has described:
“The Nightmare vision of legal advice . . . is not one of cynical lawyers making their
clients cynical.  Rather, it is the suspicion that candid, independent advice is often, or
always, an illusion.” Id. at 158.
62. See Michels, supra note 44, at 112–14 (describing a variety of factors that “can
conspire to undermine the attorney’s exercise of independent professional judgment,”
including the economic pressures to create and maintain relationships with clients,
and the lawyer’s professional identification with the client); see also Robertson, supra
note 31, at 1 (analyzing the “cognitive biases arising from partisan kinship between
lawyer and client”).  Eli Wald has observed that “[c]lient-centered loyalty supports a
professional ideology that calls for pushing the legal envelope on behalf of clients,
thus generating a professional ethos of lawyers’ identification with clients.”  Eli Wald,
Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 909, 942–43 (2009).  Such identification “in turn makes it less likely that lawyers
will attempt to engage in the kind of moral dialogue and counseling [that may serve
as] a check on loyalty to clients.” Id.; see infra Part III.A (discussing “client-centered
representation” as a model for lawyers in the advising role).
63. As Luban has put it, “[t]he lawyer-client conversation is a morally fraught mo-
ment in which the legitimacy of the legal system is, at least in microcosm, up for
grabs.” LUBAN, supra note 55, at 158.
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If the advising lawyer does exercise independence and overcomes the
temptation to remain silent when speech is needed, how should we
best understand the fruits of this independence: namely, the qualities
of “professional judgment” and “candid advice”?  And is a lawyer’s
independence from the client reconcilable with a respect for the cli-
ent’s own independence and moral autonomy?  If so, how is this to be
accomplished?  This Article now turns to these questions.
1. Professional Judgment
The ethical floor for the “professional judgment” mandated by Rule
2.1 requires a foundation of adequate information (for it to be “pro-
fessional”), as well as an “interpretation of the facts” the lawyer has
obtained and an “analysis of the legal significance of those facts.”64
But the exercise of professional judgment is “neither a matter of sim-
ply applying general rules to particular cases nor a matter of mere
intuition.”65  Rather, it may be described, at least in part, as “a process
of bringing coherence to conflicting values within the framework of
general rules and with sensitivity to highly contextualized facts and
circumstances.”66
How does a good lawyer proceed in meeting and exceeding these
fundamental professional norms?  In his landmark 1993 book, The
Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, Anthony
Kronman describes a good lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment
in advising clients as a kind of “cooperative deliberation,”67 which
combines elements of third-personal and first-personal moral
reflection:
It is from the perspective of the client’s own interests that [the
lawyer’s] judgment must be assessed.  To do this, a lawyer needs to
place himself in the client’s position by provisionally accepting his
ends and then imaginatively considering the consequences of pursu-
ing them, with the same combination of sympathy and detachment
the lawyer would employ if he were deliberating on his own account.
The kind of deliberation that is required in such cases might be
termed “third personal,” for it takes as its starting point not the
ends of the person deliberating, but someone else’s . . . .68
. . .
The lawyer’s third-personal deliberations yield an independent
judgment concerning the soundness of the client’s decision, a judg-
ment that is in principle distinguishable both from the client’s de-
64. Michels, supra note 44, at 116.
65. Gerald Postema, Moral Responsibility in Legal Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63,
68 (1980).
66. Katherine R. Kruse, Professional Role and Professional Judgment: Theory and
Practice in Legal Ethics, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 250, 250 (2011).
67. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 130 (1993).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
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clared views and the conclusion the lawyer would reach starting
from his own personal values instead (though obviously in any given
case these judgments may coincide).  Of course, the lawyer’s third-
personal judgment is open to revision as the client presents new
facts and elaborates his objectives.  And by the same token, the cli-
ent may change his own mind when he hears what his lawyer has to
say.69
The effective exercise of professional judgment in day-to-day prac-
tice requires a lawyer to make discretionary assessments, and to de-
cide how to advise clients based on those assessments.70  A
fundamentally important but often controversial aspect of this discre-
tion is the lawyer’s professional judgment that moral guidance—from
the perspective of the lawyer’s conscience—should be consciously in-
corporated into the advice given to a client.  As Robert K. Vischer has
observed, the moral dimension of legal decision making and advice
exists, whether it is brought to the fore or remains in the background:
Beyond the sense of personal incoherence it spawns, the resistance
to bringing lawyers’ own moral convictions into the attorney-client
dialogue is especially problematic given that such convictions are
often part of that dialogue, whether acknowledged by the attorney
or not.  Whenever an attorney makes sense of her client’s stated
intentions, she utilizes an interpretive judgment that is shaped by
the attorney’s own moral experience, and this same experience, in
turn, helps form whatever response the attorney offers to the cli-
ent. . . .  While the amorality of legal advice is a fiction, it is not a
69. Id. (emphasis added); see also Tania Rostain, The Company We Keep:
Kronman’s The Lost Lawyer and the Development of Moral Imagination in the Prac-
tice of Law, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1017, 1027–28 (1996) (comparing the “dominant
instrumentalist conception” of legal counseling with Kronman’s view that “[t]o coun-
sel a client well, a lawyer must ‘have some understanding of what the ends in question
mean to the client and why they are important to him’—an understanding that re-
quires the exercise of moral imagination”) (quoting KRONMAN, supra note 67, at 133).
70. Against longstanding criticisms that professional codes have been too indeter-
minate to provide adequate guidance to lawyers in their ethical decision making, Wil-
liam H. Simon has powerfully defended the importance of discretion for lawyers in
representing clients:
Many widely held views of moral life and professional judgment include as a
defining feature the willingness to wrestle with the difficulties of applying
general norms to particular circumstances. For centuries much of the attrac-
tion and dignity of the professional life has been associated with the chal-
lenge of such complex judgments. Were the issues of legal ethics ever
reduced to a matter of unreflective rule-following, many would cease to re-
gard them as issues of ethics at all.
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1131–32
(1988); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1329–30 (1995) (“When lawyers rely on inflexible rules
instead of making judgments concerning the appropriateness of different courses of
conduct in light of all the relevant interests, they risk losing the very independence
that role-differentiation theory seeks to maximize.”).
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harmless fiction because it facilitates the tendency of clients to
equate legality with permissibility.71
Stated differently, there are at least two moral compasses at hand in
every client-lawyer dialogue: whether they are being actively con-
sulted depends on the decisions made by the two persons participating
in the conversation.  For the lawyer, this decision often starts with an
“independent professional judgment” as to the kind of person he or
she will be in the practice of law.72
2. Candid Advice
Following the exercise of “professional judgment,” what does it
mean then to “render candid advice”?  At a minimum, it means the
lawyer’s legal assessment must be communicated to the client accu-
rately, even if it is not one the lawyer believes the client wants to
hear.73  The legal assessment should include both a conclusion and, to
the extent necessary and proper for the type of advice, an explanation
of how the lawyer reached the conclusion.74  But if Rule 2.1 contem-
plates nothing more than competence and accuracy in communicating
such legal conclusions and explanations to the client, it would not add
anything of substance to the norms of professional conduct already set
out in other rules.75  What further effect does the “candor” standard
have?
First, rendering “candid advice” requires more than literal truthful-
ness (i.e., not misstating the law); rather, it reflects professional expec-
tations of frankness, genuineness, and completeness.76  Second, the
text of Rule 2.1 following the “candid advice” provision suggests what
the substance of a lawyer’s frank, genuine, and complete advice might
include: “In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but
to other considerations[,] such as moral, economic, social, and political
71. ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING
THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 274 (2010).
72. See McGinniss, supra note 7, at 45 (“A deciding lawyer, confronting an ethi-
cally and morally challenging circumstance in the practice of law, should begin with a
search of his own personhood and his will to become and remain a person of virtuous
character.”).
73. Michels, supra note 44, at 119–20; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
2.1 cmt. 1 (2013) (providing “a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid
advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client”).
74. Michels, supra note 44, at 120.
75. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013) (providing “[a]
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client”); id. R. 1.4(b) (providing
“[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to a client to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation”); id. R.
8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation”).
76. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWY-
ERING § 23.2 (3d ed. 2009) (noting Rule 2.1 prohibits a lawyer from “play[ing] syco-
phant” to a client who wants to “have her own preconceptions confirmed rather than
seek genuine advice”).
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factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”77  Although
facially this standard seems purely discretionary, the comments to the
Rule suggest there are circumstances when advice on non-legal con-
siderations may be required:
Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a
client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or ef-
fects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal ad-
vice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. . . . Although a lawyer
is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations im-
pinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how
the law will be applied.
A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely techni-
cal advice. . . . When such a request is made by a client inexperi-
enced in legal matter, however, the lawyer’s responsibility as
advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than
strictly legal considerations.78
But regardless of whether there are any liability consequences for a
lawyer who declines to render non-legal advice to a client, the lawyer
may still have failed to meet the ideals of independence and candor in
the advising role.  This is especially true for a lawyer’s advice on moral
considerations, as “client representation is, at its heart, a moral activ-
ity.”79  Although rendering candid advice on moral considerations
presents a host of challenges for the advising lawyer, including the risk
of exerting undue influence or dominating the client’s decision mak-
ing, an engaged moral dialogue is ultimately a professional service to
the client.80  As Vischer notes, “allowing clients to make fully in-
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013); see also id. Scope 16 (ac-
knowledging the Rules do not “exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that
should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined
by legal rules”).
78. Id. R. 2.1 cmts. 2–3 (emphasis added).  Pointing to these Rule comments, the
drafting history of this Rule and its predecessor in the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, the law of fiduciary duty, and the rise of the “professionalism” move-
ment as broadening the understanding of what it means to be “professional,” Larry O.
Natt Gantt II has offered a powerful argument that “despite the innocuous, permis-
sive language in Rule 2.1, attorneys may be required to discuss nonlegal considera-
tions with their clients in certain instances.”  Larry O. Natt Gantt, More Than
Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Con-
siderations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 368, 371–84 (2005).
79. Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist
Society, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 984–85 (1995).
80. Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 225, 270 (2006).  Vischer offers the following words of caution and encouragement
for lawyers giving “candid advice” on moral considerations:
[A]ttorneys cannot take it upon themselves to self-translate outside the dia-
logue; they cannot unilaterally attempt to put their own moral claims into
the language of the client’s moral claims.  Moral claims must be raised from
the perspective of the claims’ holder.  By translating her own moral perspec-
tive apart from the client, the attorney purports to speak for the client on
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formed decisions based on all aspects of their attorneys’ counsel rep-
resents an enhancement of client autonomy, not a threat.”81
Rendering candid advice to a client as to moral considerations is
often neither an easy decision nor a simple undertaking.  Having the
willingness to do it generally requires the virtue of courage,82 and un-
derstanding what should be said (or not be said) always requires the
virtue of practical wisdom.83  At its heart, rendering such advice also
requires a lawyer to exercise a distinctive quality of moral indepen-
dence, based on the personal character and professional identity the
lawyer has formed before the conversation with the client ever takes
place.  As an exemplar of such a quality, this Article will now consider
Socrates of Athens.
C. The Trial of Socrates: Moral Independence in a Legal Context
Socratic independence is moral independence.84  It is constituted by
“self-knowledge,” which means “thinking for oneself and acting on
one’s own behalf.”85  It involves “being accountable for what one
thinks, says and does, so that one is prepared to justify it, stand by it,
and where one comes to see it as wrong to accept blame and punish-
ment.”86  It is closely related to the virtue of integrity.87  For Socrates,
“self-knowledge” is attained through reflection “on the values to
moral questions, presuming to share the client’s moral perspective, a pro-
position that can only be confirmed through authentic moral engagement.
But with mutual engagement impractical, the attorney must content her-
self with facilitating the client’s engagement of the attorney’s moral claims
and perceptions.  She does so by presenting them with openness and candor,
not in an effort to sway, but to inform. It bears repeating that there is no
viable choice whether or not to introduce the attorney’s morality as it is
already present and operative.  There is, however, a choice between ac-
knowledged morality and unwritten, unexamined morality.
Id. at 269–70 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Morgan & Tuttle, supra
note 79, at 993 (“Full moral engagement depends on having an objective, external
standard rather than solely a subjective ground for morality.  The lawyer should relate
to the client, not just as an integrated other but as someone whose integrity rests on
moral grounds to which the client is also subject.”).
81. Vischer, supra note 80, at 270; see also Larry O. Natt Gantt, Integration as
Integrity: Postmodernism, Psychology, and Religion on the Role of Moral Counseling
in the Attorney-Client Relationship, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 233, 239 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Gantt, Integration as Integrity] (“Including moral considerations in [a lawyer’s]
candid advice will not disrupt client autonomy if it enhances the client’s ability to
make fully informed decisions.”); see generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 46 (1998) (describing an understanding of autonomy as
“critical, self-conscious reflection on one’s moral principles”).
82. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
84. See DANA VILLA, SOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 41 (2001) (“Socrates attests to the
thinking individual’s relative moral independence, to the right to think and judge for
oneself.”).
85. ILHAM DILMAN, MORALITY AND THE INNER LIFE: A STUDY IN PLATO’S GOR-
GIAS 189 (1978).
86. Id.
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which one has given one’s heart and which determine the disposition
of one’s will.”88  He also believed that this process of self-examination
is best undertaken through repeated engagements in moral dialogue.89
Ultimately, Socrates’ moral independence was put to the test by the
laws of Athens, and his response is instructive for lawyers who will
exercise their own moral independence today.
1. Apology
At the age of seventy, Socrates was “put on trial for his life.”90  In a
recent biography, Paul Johnson has observed that “[t]he trial and
death of Socrates constitute one of the great moral events of antiquity,
indeed of history. . . .”91  The Apology is an account of Socrates’ spir-
ited self-defense, both against formal legal charges—that he was
“guilty of corrupting the minds of the young” and believed in a divin-
ity other than the gods of the Athenian state92—and against long-
standing attacks on his character.93  A lifetime filled with dialogue,
reflection, and growth in self-knowledge prepared Socrates to meet
the challenge of his trial.
The forum and atmosphere were daunting enough. Socrates “had to
speak, in the open, to a jury of 500 members, enlarged by a crowd of
onlookers composed of his friends and the merely curious, those with
87. See, e.g., George Kateb, Socratic Integrity, in NOMOS XL: INTEGRITY AND
CONSCIENCE, YEARBOOK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 77, 77 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998) (describing one aspect
of integrity as “a person’s ability to remain steadfast to a commitment through thick
and thin, overcoming internal and external obstacles, and devoting his or her whole
life to that commitment or defining one’s identity by reference to it”; “Integrity may
. . . include standing alone for the sake of some commitment . . . and refusing to go
along with others or be incorporated in their plans or deeds.  Thus, one remains whole
by refusing to be included in an objectionable larger whole.”); McGinniss, supra note
7, at 46–48 (describing integrity as a “unifying virtue for the practice of law”).
88. DILMAN, supra note 85, at 188.
89. See Christopher Rowe, Self-Examination, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
SOCRATES 201, 206 (Donald R. Morrison ed., 2011) (stating that for Socrates, “[s]elf-
examination is an extension of the examination of others, or vice-versa—and it will be
self-examination just to the extent that it is an examination of how one stands, one-
self, in relation to knowledge”).
90. DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, & JUDITH A. MCMORROW,
LAWYERS AND FUNDAMENTAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2d ed. 2010).
91. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 152.
92. Apology, supra note 15, at 10 (24b); see R. E. ALLEN, SOCRATES AND LEGAL
OBLIGATION 18 (1980) (providing historical background on the indictment against
Socrates, and opining that “the charges of irreligion . . . probably had a procedural
rather than a substantive effect,” allowing use of a “writ of impiety”; “The heart of the
charge against him . . . was corrupting the youth.”).
93. “[W]hat did my critics say in attacking my character?  I must read out their
affidavit, so to speak, as though they were my legal accusers: Socrates is guilty of
criminal meddling, in that he inquires into things below the earth and in the sky, and
makes the weaker argument defeat the stronger, and teaches others to follow his ex-
ample.” Apology, supra note 15, at 5 (19b-c).
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nothing better to do.”94  At the same time, though believing in his
innocence of the charges, Socrates “accepted his trial as a perfectly
valid expression of Athenian law and democracy.”95  In his character,
he was a “curious mixture of genuine humility and obstinate pride”;
though “[h]e never made claims for himself as to knowledge or vir-
tue,” he deeply believed in justice—and he would therefore “not be
unjust to himself” in his own defense.96 Johnson explains Socrates’
strategy of self-representation:
His best strategy, and one that a professional advocate would cer-
tainly have recommended, was to bring forward a succession of wit-
nesses of impeccable character to testify, first, to his observation of
the outward forms of Athenian religion and, second, to his having
instructed them in ways that had led to their strong affection for
virtuous civic principles. This would not have been difficult to do.
But Socrates would not do it.  It was against his principles in that it
gave a misleading view of what he had been trying to do in his life
for the best part of half a century.97
Thus, in his steadfast commitment to his beliefs and principles, in-
cluding the virtue of truthfulness, Socrates argues with passionate in-
dependence, even when it is contrary to the interest of self-
preservation.98  He will not present witnesses, as to either his charac-
ter or his conduct. In representing himself, his tactical choice is to pre-
sent to his friends and neighbors the very self of Socrates and to trust
in justice.  His defense, as his life, is a moral argument.
As his trial draws to a close, Socrates denies that there is any con-
flict between a person acting virtuously and avoiding harm.99  Even
when the votes of the jurors have been counted100 and he has been
deemed guilty of violating the law, he declines to argue for a mitigat-
ing sentence of imprisonment or exile: this is because who he is (a
philosopher) and his calling (to philosophize)101 are bound up with his
independence in walking the streets of Athens and speaking to his
neighbors.102  He then proclaims courageously to the jury of his fellow
94. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 157.
95. Id. at 156.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 159.
98. See TERENCE IRWIN, PLATO’S ETHICS 44–45 (1995).
99. Id. at 45.
100. The vote of the 501 jurors (dikasts) was 280 for conviction, and 221 against.
COQUILLETTE ET AL., supra note 90, at 27.
101. At several times in the course of his defense, Socrates alludes to his divine
calling to philosophize, and his commitment to obey the commands of God. See, e.g.,
Apology, supra note 15, at 15 (29d) (“I owe greater obedience to God than to you,
and so long as I draw breath and have my faculties, I shall never stop practicing phi-
losophy and exhorting you and elucidating the truth for everyone I meet.”).
102. See id. at 23 (37e-38a) (explaining that he could not “spend the rest of [his] life
minding [his] own business,” because “discussing goodness and all the other subjects
about which you hear me talking and examining both myself and others is really the
best thing a man can do, and . . . life without this sort of examination is not worth
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citizens, as they are poised to sentence him to death, that “nothing can
harm a good man either in life or after death.”103  As Terence Irwin
has noted, for Socrates, “[i]f nothing can harm him, then his justice
cannot harm him.”104
2. Crito
Nearly a month after his trial and while in prison awaiting his exe-
cution, Socrates receives a visit from his friend Crito, from whom
Plato’s dialogue receives its name.105  Crito seeks to persuade Socrates
to cooperate with a plan to rescue him from prison before the sen-
tence is carried out.106  If the Socratic problem in the Apology is best
described as one of argument (namely, “How I should I defend my life
and my very self before a jury of my fellow citizens?”), his problem in
the Crito is one of action.107  Will Socrates escape, or will he obey the
law, even if that means he will be put to death?  In deciding upon his
course of action, Socrates must examine his conscience, and he does
this through two modes of dialogue: the first with Crito, and the sec-
ond (in Crito’s presence) between himself and a personified “Laws of
Athens.”108
living”).  Reflecting the importance freedom of movement held for Socrates, earlier in
the trial, he offers an animated metaphor in describing his call of philosophical inde-
pendence in relation to the state:
It is literally true, even if it sounds rather comical, that God has specially
appointed me to this city, as though it were a large thoroughbred horse
which because of its great size is inclined to be lazy and needs the stimula-
tion of some stinging fly.  It seems to me that God has attached me to this
city to perform the office of such a fly, and all day long I never cease to settle
here, there, and everywhere, rousing, persuading, reproving every one of
you.
Apology, supra note 15, at 16–17 (30e-31a).  Martin Luther King Jr. alludes to this
passage in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, written to fellow Christian ministers
skeptical of his morally independent decisions and actions in challenging segregation:
Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so
that individuals could shake off the bondage of myths and half-truths and
rise to the realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, so must we see
the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that
will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majes-
tic heights of understanding and brotherhood.
Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, CHRISTIAN CENTURY June 12,
1963, reprinted in ETHICS: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 358, 361 (Gordon Marino ed.,
Modern Library 2010).
103. Apology, supra note 15, at 25 (41c-d).
104. IRWIN, supra note 98, at 45.
105. PLATO, Crito, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 27, 27 (43a)
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Hugh Tredennick trans., Princeton Univ.
Press 1961) [hereinafter Crito].
106. Id. at 30–31 (45a-47a).
107. See A.D. WOOZLEY, LAW AND OBEDIENCE: THE ARGUMENTS OF PLATO’S
Crito 6 (1979).
108. See Crito, supra note 105.
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To persuade Socrates to escape, Crito “claims that it would be both
harmful and unjust, and therefore shameful, for Socrates to stay in
prison.”109  But Socrates, exercising moral independence, declines
Crito’s implied invitation to understand what is “just and unjust” by
reference to the “opinion of the many,”110 who would understand his
reasons for fleeing an unjust verdict both for his own sake and his
children’s.111  Socrates reaffirms the steadfast commitment to justice
he expressed in the Apology, as well as his firm belief he cannot be
harmed by acting justly.112 A human being’s foremost concern should
be moral: what is truly important is not simply to live, but to “live
well.”113  Socrates then declares that “living well, living finely, and liv-
ing justly are the same.”114  As Terence Irwin has observed, “[t]his
claim explains why the good person cannot be harmed; he cannot be
harmed if he cannot be deprived of happiness, and if he lives justly he
is happy.”115
Socrates’ independence in the Crito consists of his willingness to
live, and die, with allegiance to the moral convictions and principles
that made him Socrates.  He believes injustice is always wrong, and
just as much so when it involves retaliation for another injustice.116
Thus, despite the personal injustice Athens has done to him under its
laws, Socrates refuses to will an injustice in return and refuses his con-
sent to Crito’s plan to effect his escape.117
But notably, for Socrates, moral independence is not an expression
of radical individualism.118  Socrates exercises his independence, not
only by acting in accordance with his conscience and in obedience to
his understanding of God’s will, but also by acting for the sake of his
allegiance to Athens.119  In the personified voice of the “Laws of Ath-
109. IRWIN, supra note 98, at 45; see Crito, supra note 105, at 30–31 (46a).
110. Crito, supra note 105, at 32 (47c-d).
111. See id. at 30 (45c-d).
112. IRWIN, supra note 98, at 45.
113. Crito, supra note 105, at 33 (48b3-6).
114. IRWIN, supra note 98, at 45 (citing Crito 48b8-9).
115. See id.; see also ALLEN, supra note 92, at 70 (“Whether or not Socrates should
escape has nothing to do with what most people think, but solely with whether it is
right or wrong, just or unjust.  That question must be settled by logoi, arguments,
accounts, reasoned conclusions.”).
116. See Crito, supra note 105, at 34 (49b-d); see also JOHNSON, supra note 11, at
172–73 (observing that “[t]he governing principle of [Socrates’] life was that a wrong
could never justify another wrong in response”).
117. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 173 (stating that Socrates “thought his convic-
tion was mistaken and his sentence unjust,” but also believed that “to seek to evade it
by bribery [of the jailer] and corruption would be an even greater wrong,” being
“greater in that he knew it to be unjust”).
118. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 963, 964 n.4 (1987) [hereinafter Shaffer, Radical Individualism] (asserting that
“Socrates’ and Aristotle’s ethics of character are as incompatible with the ethics of
radical individualism as religious ethics”).
119. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 172 (noting that for Socrates, “[o]bedience to
God came before any law, however righteous,” but that Socrates regarded this as
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ens,” Socrates asks himself a series of questions directed at the
sources of his duty of allegiance and obedience.120  These questions
call to mind (1) Socrates’ indebtedness to his country for protecting
his ancestors, his parents, and himself;121 (2) his implied agreement to
abide by its rule of law, and the decisions of its tribunals, through his
own decision to remain a citizen living within the country’s borders;122
and (3) the harm it would do to respect for the rule of law were Socra-
tes to “commit this breach of faith and stain [his] conscience.”123  As
Paul Johnson eloquently describes, Socrates was profoundly loyal to
Athens, his homeland:
He regarded Athens as the best place on earth to live, and it had
always provided him with the perfect setting for his mission in life.
He loved its people, with all their faults, its streets and trades, its
public places.  Its government was always imperfect, often
grievously remiss, and sometimes monstrous.  But it was his city,
which he had fought for, and to which he belonged inextricably.
Everyone, even or especially philosophers, had to accept the rule of
law of the place where they lived.124
Thus, following a lifetime of studious self-examination and engaged
moral dialogue seeking to know what virtue is and how to live virtu-
ously, Socrates holds himself accountable for what he has learned, and
for what he believes, by submitting himself to the most strenuous
claims of conscience, loyalty, and justice.
3. Kierkegaard on Socrates
Søren Kierkegaard, philosophizing and writing in nineteenth-cen-
tury Denmark, “perceived his own situation as strongly analogous to
being a reason “merely to accept the consequences, even death, of obeying a higher
law,” rather than as a reason to “defy law”).
120. See Crito, supra note 105, at 35–39 (50a-54d).
121. Id. at 35–36 (50c-51d).
122. Id. at 36–38 (51d-53a).
123. Id. at 38 (53a); see also id. at 35 (50a-b) (“Can you deny that by this act which
you are contemplating you intend, so far as you have the power, to destroy us, the
laws, and the whole state as well?”).  As R. E. Allen has observed:
[The Laws of Athens] allow that the particular verdict under which Socrates
lies condemned may well be unjust, in that he is innocent of the charge of
which he was found guilty. . . .  But it will be found that [the implied] agree-
ment [to abide by the rule of law and judicial decisions] is not used to pro-
vide an independent reason for refusing to escape.  Rather, it establishes the
authority of law over Socrates as a citizen.  The wrongfulness of escape will
be found to consist, not in breach of agreement, but in the fact that such
breach implies injury to the legal order, the Laws of Athens, by denial of its
authority.  In short, the wrongfulness of escape derives from the primacy of
justice.
ALLEN, supra note 92, at 75–76.
124. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 172–73.
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that of Socrates in ancient Greece.”125  He made Socrates a prominent
figure in several of his major writings,126 including his 1843 disserta-
tion entitled The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socra-
tes.127  In this work, Kierkegaard offers an assessment of Socrates and
the relation of his thought to the well-known injunction of the Oracle
of Delphi to “know yourself”:128
It is customary to characterize Socrates’ position also with the well-
known phrase: . . . [Know yourself]. . . .  Now it is certainly true that
the phrase . . . can designate subjectivity in its fullness, inwardness
in its utterly infinite wealth, but for Socrates this self-knowledge was
not so copious; it actually contained nothing more than the separat-
ing, the singling out, of what later became the object of knowledge.
The phrase ‘know yourself’ means: separate yourself from the
other.129
Thus, Kierkegaard views Socratic “self-knowledge” as involving an el-
ement of ironic detachment, or “separation,” exhibited in the dia-
logues when Socrates “placed individuals under his dialectical vacuum
pump,” and “pumped away the atmospheric air they were accustomed
to breathing, and left them standing there.”130  In this early work,
Kierkegaard portrays Socrates as a thoroughgoing ironist, not only
when engaged in his customary dialogue with partners, but also when
Socrates is on trial defending his own life.131  But as C. Stephen Evans
has observed, in subsequent works Kierkegaard portrays Socrates
more three-dimensionally, “not merely as an ironist but as an ethicist
using irony as his incognito.”132
125. C. STEPHEN EVANS, KIERKEGAARD: AN INTRODUCTION 39 (2009) [hereinafter
EVANS, KIERKEGAARD: AN INTRODUCTION].
126. See, e.g., SøREN KIERKEGAARD, PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS (Howard V.
Hong & Edna H. Hong eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1985) (1844) [hereinafter
KIERKEGAARD, PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS]; see also SøREN KIERKEGAARD, CON-
CLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS (Howard V.
Hong & Edna H. Hong eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1992) (1846) [hereinafter
KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT].
127. SøREN KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF IRONY, WITH CONTINUAL REFER-
ENCE TO SOCRATES (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong eds. & trans., Princeton
Univ. Press 1989) (1843) [hereinafter KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF IRONY].
128. See PLATO, Phaedrus, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO
475, 478 (230a) (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., R. Hackforth trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1961) (Socrates: “I can’t as yet ‘know myself,’ as the inscription
at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to
inquire into extraneous matters.”).
129. KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF IRONY, supra note 127, at 177.
130. Id. at 178.
131. In The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard goes so far as to assert that “[t]he whole
Apology in its totality is an ironic work.” Id. at 37.  He suggests “most of the accusa-
tions boil down to a nothing—not to a nothing in the usual sense of the word, but to a
nothing that Socrates simply passes off as the content of his life, which again is irony.”
Id.  He describes Socrates’ argument as “not really contain[ing] any defense at all but
[as] in part a legpulling of his accusers and in part a genial chat with his judges.” Id.
132. C. STEPHEN EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS AND POSTSCRIPT: THE RE-
LIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF JOHANNES CLIMACUS 193 (1999) [hereinafter EVANS,
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As further developed in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, “self-knowl-
edge” does not truly “designate subjectivity in its fullness.”133  Instead,
self-knowledge is only part of the process of becoming a self,134 with
the properly formed self being a synthesis of passion and reflection.135
Becoming a self also involves becoming a “subject,”136 and a person
whose life expresses “subjectivity.”137  Becoming subjective is the
“highest task assigned to a human being.”138  Kierkegaardian “subjec-
tivity” requires a substantial degree of self-assertive moral indepen-
dence, a willingness to commit to values139 and principles forming the
basis for one’s existence, and then to take responsibility as a self by
deciding and acting in accordance with those values and principles.140
In Socrates, Kierkegaard found not only a classical precursor on the
path to Christianity,141 but also a paradigm for subjectivity for his
KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS AND POSTSCRIPT]; see KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING
UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT, supra note 126, at 503 (in the voice of pseudonym Johan-
nes Climacus, expounding that an ethicist such as Socrates “uses irony as his incog-
nito” and as “the unity of ethical passion,” accentuating the first-personal demands of
ethical requirements).
133. See KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF IRONY, supra note 127, at 177 (emphasis
added).
134. See RUDD, SELF, NARRATIVE, & VALUE, supra note 24, at 42 (observing that
“Kierkegaardian selfhood . . . is not an all-or-nothing matter; one has more or less of
it as one approaches or recedes from the ideal”).
135. See Robert C. Roberts, Existence, Emotion, and Virtue: Classical Themes in
Kierkegaard, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KIERKEGAARD 177, 182 (Alastair
Hannay & Gordon D. Marino eds., 1998) (“[Kierkegaard’s] basic position is that the
mature self is a proper synthesis of passion and reflection.  Passion without reflection
is immature, unformed, chaotic, and childish ‘immediacy,’ and reflection without pas-
sion is . . . personal emptiness.”).
136. See EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS AND POSTSCRIPT, supra note 132, at
37 (stating for Kierkegaard, “[e]xistence is the process of becoming a subject”).
137. Although he often used the terms “subjectivity” and “inwardness” somewhat
interchangeably, see id. at 39, Kierkegaard also insisted that “[s]ubjectivity demands
outward expression.” Id. at 284.
138. KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT, supra note 126, at
129.
139. As Evans has noted, for Kierkegaard “[v]alues can only be recognized and
actualized in subjectivity” (i.e., with passion). EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS
AND POSTSCRIPT, supra note 132, at 69.  Nevertheless, “[t]he fact that values are only
realized in and through passion does not entail that values are reducible to human
passions” or “merely subjective preferences.” Id. at 69–70.  To believe so is to “ignore
the possibility that human emotions and attitudes . . . in themselves could be war-
ranted or unwarranted, profound or trivial, in tune with the nature of reality or out of
tune, ‘true’ or ‘false.’” Id. at 70 (citing C. S. Lewis).
140. RUDD, SELF, NARRATIVE, & VALUE, supra note 24, at 14 (observing that for
Kierkegaard “what is ethically important about self-knowledge” is “its connection
with the taking of responsibility for oneself”); EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS
AND POSTSCRIPT, supra note 132, at 38 (becoming “subjective” for Kierkegaard
means “[o]ne must seize responsibility for one’s own life by consciously recognizing
who one is and choosing to become the person one should be”).
141. SøREN KIERKEGAARD, THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH: A CHRISTIAN PSYCHO-
LOGICAL EXPOSITION FOR UPBUILDING AND AWAKENING 87–96 (Howard V. Hong &
Edna H. Hong eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1980) (1849) [hereinafter KIERKE-
GAARD, THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH] (relating and contrasting Socratic concepts and
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time, who lived with the passion and commitment142 to seek after the
truth to the best of his understanding, and then to courageously de-
fend that truth.143
It is important to emphasize Kierkegaard insists that the properly
formed self must be relational144 and not isolated or solipsistic, and
that the nature and quality of the self’s commitments must withstand
substantive moral scrutiny.145  Anthony Rudd has recently described
Kierkegaard’s “account of the self” in Platonic terms, as reflecting a
principles to those of Christianity); cf. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 187–88 (explaining
how Socrates’ “notions of life and death, body and soul,” and his example “gave clar-
ity and power to the Greek world’s reception of Christianity and so made it more
fruitful”).
142. See Edward F. Mooney, Introduction: A Socratic and Christian Care for the
Self, in ETHICS, LOVE, AND FAITH IN KIERKEGAARD 1, 6 (Edward F. Mooney ed.,
2008) (examining Kierkegaard’s affinity with Socrates, whom he saw as a “filter
against thoughtlessness and a paragon of those passions necessary for a fully moral
and religious life”).
143. The Socratic principle, as Kierkegaard explains in the voice of pseudonym Jo-
hannes Climacus, is that “subjectivity is truth.” See KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING
UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT, supra note 126, at 204 (“The thesis that subjectivity . . . is
truth contains the Socratic wisdom, the underlying merit of which is to have paid
attention to the essential meaning of existing, of the knower’s being an existing per-
son.  That is why, in his ignorance, Socrates was in the truth in the highest sense
within paganism.”); see also EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS AND POSTSCRIPT,
supra note 132, at 115–35 (discussing “Truth and Subjectivity”).  The Christian princi-
ple, in contrast, is that “subjectivity is untruth.” As Evans explains:
The thesis that subjectivity is the truth lies within the sphere of immanence
[rather than transcendence]. . . .  It is a thesis that lies within the realm mas-
tered by Socrates. . . .  Having explained this thesis, Climacus then goes on to
ask if there is a view that is distinctively different, a view that requires still
more inwardness.  This he finds in the thesis that subjectivity is untruth, the
assumption that the individual is not capable of doing the truth or being in
the truth, but must acquire the capability. . . .  The Christian principle that
subjectivity is untruth, when combined with the claim that subjectivity is the
truth, provides a ‘higher’ view, Climacus thinks.  But it is higher because it
affords a deeper subjectivity, so in a sense it takes over and deepens the
immanent principle.
EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS AND POSTSCRIPT, supra note 132, at 133–34
(citing KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT, supra note 126); see
also RUDD, LIMITS OF THE ETHICAL, supra note 7, at 159 (explaining that although
“Kierkegaard insists that truth is subjectivity in order to turn us away from the wholly
misleading attitude of objectivism,” he also insists that “subjectivity is untruth”; “[A]s
a fallen creature, a sinner, wholly alienated from God, I am unable to relate to Him
even through the most passionate subjectivity, for there is, from the start, a corrup-
tion, an ‘untruth’ within me.”) (citing KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC
POSTSCRIPT, supra note 126, at 185).
144. RUDD, SELF, NARRATIVE, & VALUE, supra note 24, at 43 (“Kierkegaard
claims that it is only by properly relating to something other than itself that the self
can relate properly to itself.”).  Kierkegaard also states that the self will be in “de-
spair,” which is the “sickness unto death,” unless it properly relates itself to “that
which established the entire relation” (i.e., God). KIERKEGAARD, THE SICKNESS
UNTO DEATH, supra note 141, at 13; see also RUDD, SELF, NARRATIVE, & VALUE,
supra note 24, at 46 (noting for Kierkegaard this “need for God” is “ultimately for
God as understood in Christianity”).
145. RUDD, SELF, NARRATIVE, & VALUE, supra note 24, at 46.
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teleological commitment to relate one’s self to “the Good.”146  Rudd
offers a broad description of “the Good” as “an objective, normative
standard (or perhaps coherent set of standards) to which we need to
relate in order to achieve harmony within ourselves.”147  As Rudd ac-
knowledges, this is a “more metaphysically modest understanding of
the Good than Kierkegaard’s own ultimate one,” which is grounded in
Christianity.148  Rudd then posits that for Kierkegaard, “to give a
shape to one’s life” a properly formed self not only must commit to a
“guiding sense of the Good” and to “authoritative criteria” for mak-
ing choices, but also must “commit to projects and relationships.”149
How might these principles offer a moral vision and inspiration for
the advising lawyer?  As a starting point, one might say that the
Kierkegaardian lawyer is a subject: an independent person who is pur-
poseful (telos) and relational, and one who has formed a good charac-
ter and a well-developed and coherent personal and professional
identity.  As a moral counselor, the Kierkegaardian lawyer will relate
to the client not only objectively (through legal analysis detached
from what it means to be an existing person), but also subjectively—
i.e., as one subject to another.150
III. LAWYERS AS MORAL COUNSELORS
This Article has offered a legal account of lawyer “independence”
and “candor” in the advising of clients under Rule 2.1, and an ethical
and moral151 account of “independence” from the perspective of Soc-
rates (and his philosophical descendant Kierkegaard).  Now the stage
is set for examining how a twenty-first-century lawyer should proceed
in fulfilling not merely the requirements, but the ideals of service in
the advising role.  In particular, what moral obligations—and free-
doms—exist for a lawyer when serving clients as an advisor, and how
146. Id. at 45.
147. Id. at 46.
148. Id. As Rudd explains, “Kierkegaard . . . follows Plato in seeing the Good as
‘Eternal’ and distinct from particular goods,” and that “following a long tradition of
Christian (and, for that matter, Jewish and Islamic) Platonism,” he goes on to identify
the “Good with God.” RUDD, SELF, NARRATIVE, & VALUE, supra note 24, at 45; see
also EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS AND POSTSCRIPT, supra note 132, at
134–35 (expressing his view that “Climacus’ whole discussion of truth and subjectivity
is implicitly a commentary on John 14:6: ‘I am the way, the truth, and the life.’  There
Jesus did not merely claim to bring men the truth, but to be the truth.”).
149. Rudd notes that Kierkegaard insists “very strongly that what commitment to
the Good means concretely will differ for each individual.” RUDD, SELF, NARRA-
TIVE, & VALUE, supra note 24, at 47 (citing SøREN KIERKEGAARD, UPBUILDING DIS-
COURSES IN VARIOUS SPIRITS 93–94, 122–48 (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong eds.
& trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1993) (1843)).  He also emphasizes that “for Kierke-
gaard as for Plato, one makes [a] commitment to the Good just because it is good; not
because it is a means to one’s ends.” Id.
150. See infra Part III.C (“The Lawyer as Trustworthy Neighbor”).
151. See Shaffer, Radical Individualism, supra note 118, at 965 (“Ethics properly
defined is thinking about morals.”).
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does a lawyer’s “independence” promote human flourishing in the cli-
ent-lawyer relationship?  This examination will proceed by first exam-
ining legal ethics’ “standard conception of the lawyer’s role”; by then
considering the “friendship” analogy for client-lawyer relations, as
seen through the eyes of several legal ethics scholars; and finally, by
proposing the ideal of the “trustworthy neighbor” for a lawyer serving
clients as an advisor, especially in the context of moral issues relating
to the representation.
A. The Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role
According to legal ethics’ “standard conception of the lawyer’s
role,” the relationship between lawyer and client is governed by three
basic principles: (1) partisanship, (2) neutrality, and (3) nonac-
countability.152  As Tim Dare has explained, the principle of partisan-
ship “specifies that the lawyer’s sole allegiance is to the client.  Within,
but all the way up to, the limits of the law, the lawyer is committed to
the aggressive and single-minded pursuit of the client’s objectives.”153
The principle of neutrality “states that the lawyer must remain profes-
sionally neutral with respect to the moral merits of the client or the
client’s objectives.”154  Finally, as previously described,155 the princi-
ple of nonaccountability—which Dare calls “the core idea” of the
standard conception—“purports to exempt lawyers from the normal
moral practice of judging someone to have acted immorally if they
have knowingly and deliberately helped another to act immorally.”156
As applied to the advising role, the standard conception denotes a
lawyer (1) has a positive duty to provide information and explanations
to the client about all legally available means to promote their inter-
ests; (2) after providing such advice, has a positive duty to follow
through on the client’s directions to pursue ends or use means the
lawyer believes immoral, provided they are lawful; and (3) having
done so, the lawyer’s actions are not to be judged by the immorality of
either the means or the ends, as a non-lawyer’s would be.157  Under
this role-differentiated158 approach to lawyering, William H. Simon
152. TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CON-
CEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 5–11 (2009); see also WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 7–9 (1998) (calling the stan-
dard conception “the Dominant View,” the “core principle [of which] is this: the law-
yer must—or at least may—pursue any goal of the client through any arguably legal
course of action and assert any nonfrivolous legal claim”).
153. DARE, supra note 152, at 5.
154. Id. at 8.
155. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
156. DARE, supra note 152, at 10.
157. Id. at 12.
158. Id. Dare emphasizes that “[t]his conception of the lawyer’s role relies upon a
broader picture of the structure of ethical obligation, according to which such obliga-
tion may be ‘role-differentiated.’” Id.  Because, “the idea goes, [ethical obligations]
attach primarily to social roles,” a person acting in the social role of “lawyer” is “quite
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has observed “the only ethical duty distinctive to the lawyer’s role is
loyalty to the client,” and “[l]egal ethics impose no responsibility to
third parties or the public different from that of the minimal compli-
ance with the law that is required of everyone.”159
Over the course of several decades, criticism of the standard con-
ception has been both steady and emphatic.160  David Luban, who ad-
vocates an alternative conception he describes as “moral activism,”161
has said “[t]he central question raised by the standard conception is
why lawyers get a free pass from morality in a pastime that is far from
victimless.”162  Moreover, he notes that because lawyers do their work
“through speech and persuasion,” their “moral faculties are fully en-
gaged in a way that seems uniquely hard to square with non-accounta-
bility.”163  Luban and others have closely studied the “adversary
system excuse” generally presented in support of the principles of par-
tisanship and neutrality, and found it wanting.164  But it has proved
literally subject to different moral standards” than others who act in different roles.
Id. at 12–13; see also William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A
Critique of Some Academic Perspectives, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987 (2010).
159. SIMON, supra note 152, at 8.  Simon contrasts “the Dominant View” with “the
Public Interest View,” the basic principle of which is that “law should be applied in
accordance with its purposes, and litigation should be conducted so as to promote
informed resolution on the substantive merits.” Id.  As an alternative to either of
these approaches, he proposes what he calls “the Contextual View,” the basic princi-
ple of which is that “the lawyer should take such actions as, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.” Id. at 9. But cf.
W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 44–48 (2010) (criticizing
Simon’s “Contextual View” as essentially a “moral critique” of the standard concep-
tion, and advocating his own variation as a legal ethics obligating a lawyer “to act on
the basis of clients’ legal entitlements, not her clients’ interests or her own views
about what substantive justice requires”); William H. Simon, Authoritarian Legal Eth-
ics: Bradley Wendel and the Positivist Turn, 90 TEX. L. REV. 709 (2012) (responding to
Wendel’s critique); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics Is About the Law, Not Morality
or Justice: A Reply to Critics, 90 TEX. L. REV. 727 (2012) (responding to Simon).
160. Cf. Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics,
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529, 1543 (1984) (acknowledging the force of the critique of the
standard conception, but insisting it is “really only one, and never a completely domi-
nant, strand of thought in a vague and sometimes contradictory field”).
161. LUBAN, supra note 55, at 11–12 (declaring that lawyers cannot avoid moral
accountability and, thus, should accept moral responsibility for their practice of law).
But cf. Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 367,
394–95 (1992) (“[T]he recognition that the lawyer’s loyalty obligation has moral
weight is important,” as it “suggests, for example, that David Luban creates a false
dichotomy when he asserts that moral obligations take precedence over professional
obligations.  Luban fails to recognize that strictly professional obligations can entail
moral obligations, particularly the moral obligation of loyal service to the client.”).
162. David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV. 673, 674–75 (2012) (book
review).
163. Id. at 675 (citing Postema, supra note 65, at 73, 76; Richard Wasserstrom, Law-
yers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 14 (1975–1976)).
164. See, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 83, 83–118 (David Luban ed., 1983) (intro-
ducing the phrase “adversary system excuse” and explaining its insufficiency as a
moral justification for lawyer conduct); SIMON, supra note 152, at 130–44 (criticizing
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even more difficult to identify and defend alternatives to the standard
conception that are both theoretically sound and practically
feasible.165
The standard conception of the lawyer’s role has significantly im-
pacted scholarly discussions of models for the advising and counseling
of clients.166  Among those generally advocated today,167 the one most
closely aligned with the standard conception is the traditional client-
counseling model known as “client-centered representation.”168  Ema-
nating from “a belief in the autonomy, intelligence, dignity, and basic
morality of the individual client,” its advocates have argued these cli-
ent attributes are best promoted if the lawyer “maintain[s] an appear-
ance of neutrality and refrain[s] from providing direct advice.”169
In its early versions (i.e., from the 1970s through the 1990s), the
“client-centered” model typically involved several elements, including
lawyers (1) helping to “identify problems from a client’s perspective”;
the adversary system excuse as inadequate); see also LUBAN, supra note 55, at 19–64
(revising his 1983 essay).
165. See, e.g., Postema, supra note 65, at 81–83 (reconceiving the lawyer’s role as a
“recourse role,” such that it has built into it the recourse of breaking role when re-
quired by other moral principles); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS:
ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 5 (2008) (arguing that the virtue of
“fidelity,” distinct from client loyalty insofar as it “involves more than merely partisan
partiality in favor of clients over others,” is an attribute that offers lawyers “their best
hope for ethical vindication of their professional lives”); cf. Norman W. Spaulding,
Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2003) (contending
the lawyer’s role is founded in notions of service to the client, with moral neutrality as
to the client’s attributes, rather than identification with the client).
166. See, e.g., Morgan & Tuttle, supra note 79, at 986–98 (contrasting “two compet-
ing paradigms to describe the moral activity of legal representation that we call ‘the
amoral instrument’ and ‘the ethical counselor,’” with the former paradigm being
based on the standard conception of the lawyer’s advising role).
167. A good example of a longstanding but no longer defended approach is the
“authoritarian model,” which is premised on the following assumptions: (1) lawyers
“give adequate and effective service” and “are able to be disinterested and make
objective decisions”; (2) “[t]he solutions to legal problems are primarily technical,”
and “[o]rdinarily, there is a correct solution to a legal problem”; and (3) “[l]awyers
are experts in the technical information that is needed to arrive at the correct conclu-
sion.” ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA, & MARTHA M. PETERS, THE
COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING 2–3 (2d ed. 2006) (citing DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND
CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 2, 169 (1974)) [hereinafter COCHRAN ET AL., A COLLAB-
ORATIVE APPROACH].  Although some lawyers do engage in such “authoritarian” ad-
vising, see id. at 2, client-counseling scholars have generally rejected it as a model.
See, e.g., id. at 3–4 (arguing the “authoritarian” approach is inconsistent with “client
dignity” and the value and benefits of “client control,” including the “opportunity to
be good, to make moral choices, and to grow in moral understanding”).
168. See generally DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977) (coining the phrase and
introducing it as a model). The Binder and Price version of the “client-centered” ap-
proach was updated in 1991. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991).
169. COCHRAN ET AL., A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH, supra note 167, at 5 (quot-
ing BINDER & PRICE, supra note 168).
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(2) actively involving the client “in the process of exploring potential
solutions” and identifying “the likely consequences to the client of
each option”; (3) “expand[ing] their view of the client’s ‘case’ to in-
clude nonlegal aspects”; and (4) “accept[ing] the client’s values and
giv[ing] advice based on them.”170  Prominent advocates for this ap-
proach argued that “[b]ecause client autonomy is of paramount im-
portance, decisions should be made on the basis of what choice is most
likely to provide a client with maximum satisfaction.”171  This last point
of emphasis has made the “client-centered” model susceptible to criti-
cism as encouraging lawyers to “steer clients toward self-centered de-
cision making,” focusing on “consequences to the client” to the
detriment of considering consequences “to all people that might be
affected by the client’s decision.”172  Moreover, the emphasis on law-
yer neutrality in providing advice has been criticized as an overcorrec-
tion for the shortcomings of the “authoritarian” approach to client
counseling.173
Over the course of the last decade, Katherine R. Kruse has written
several articles defending and refining various aspects of “client-cen-
tered representation,” especially in the advising role.174  Significantly,
she has defended the model against charges that it promotes client
selfishness by arguing a client’s “interests” should be understood
broadly by the lawyer to include the consequences client decisions
may have on others whose well-being is valued by the client.175
170. Id. at 4–5 (citing BINDER & PRICE, supra note 168).
171. Id. at 5 (quoting BINDER & PRICE, supra note 168, at 261) (emphasis in
original).
172. Id. at 5.  In addition, in its heavy focus on consequences and maximizing satis-
faction, the moral philosophy underlying the “client-centered” counseling model is
rooted in utilitarianism. Id. at 174 (noting that “[d]ecision making under the client-
centered model is a matter of cost-benefit analysis,” and considers only “Conse-
quences to the Client,” while “ignoring the importance of other people”); see also
McGinniss, supra note 7, at 33 (discussing consequentialism and utilitarianism as ap-
proaches to legal ethics).
173. See COCHRAN ET AL., A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH, supra note 167, at 5;
see also supra note 167 (describing the “authoritarian” approach to client counseling).
174. See Katherine R. Kruse, Engaged Client-Centered Representation and the
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 577,
586–94 (2011) [hereinafter Kruse, Engaged Client-Centered Representation]; Kathe-
rine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
103, 127–34 (2010) [hereinafter Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients]; see also Katherine
R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV.
389, 391, 411–21 (2005) [hereinafter Kruse, Challenge of Moral Pluralism] (arguing
“the traditional model”—i.e., the standard conception of client-lawyer relations—and
“client-centered lawyering” are better suited than alternative “social justice” models
to address the challenges of a morally pluralistic society).
175. See Kruse, Engaged Client-Centered Representation, supra note 174, at 588
(describing “engaged client-centered representation” as “a process of value clarifica-
tion that includes techniques of active listening and probing beneath the surface of a
client’s stated wishes to ensure that what the client says he wants is consistent with the
client’s other values,” such as “relationships with others”); Kruse, Beyond Cardboard
Clients, supra note 174, at 132–33 (“Legal interest-based counseling, however, serves
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Kruse’s account of client-centered representation acknowledges that
clients “do not arrive with static and pre-determined objectives to
which the lawyers can simply defer.”176  She further recognizes that
these objectives may change in the course of the representation,
shaped by clients’ “evolving desires about what they want”177 as well
as “the information about the law and available legal options that
their lawyers explain to them.”178  Nevertheless, Kruse expressly dis-
approves of any “moral give-and-take” between lawyers and clients
that seeks to do more than help clients clarify and articulate their own
values in the context of the legal situation.179  Under her approach,
lawyers engage in moral advising as a matter of process, and should
refrain from acting out of concern for their clients’ character changing
for the better or worse as a result of the legal situation.180
In her writings, Kruse has strongly criticized what she calls “social
justice” models of client-lawyer relations, in which lawyers are vari-
ously conceived of (and their ethical duties explained in light of) their
statuses as “moral agents,”181 “jurisprudents,”182 or “friends.”183  One
element these conceptions have in common, Kruse observes, is an en-
dorsement of a more positive and proactive role for the lawyer’s
moral values when representing clients.184  This Article will focus on
the third of these conceptions—the lawyer as “friend”—as a founda-
tion for suggesting another choice of moral ideal—the lawyer as
“trustworthy neighbor.”
B. The Friendship Analogy for Client-Lawyer Relations
In recent decades, scholars have discerned analogous relationships
between lawyers’ duties to clients and the obligations of one friend to
the actualization of the client’s life goals only indirectly.  Legal interests are not good
in themselves; they are merely the channels by which clients can use the law to pursue
and protect what they value in life.”).  Kruse makes a critical distinction between the
“legal objectification” of clients (referring to lawyers’ tendency to “issue-spot” their
clients as they would the facts on a law school exam), and a “three-dimensional” view
of the client as a whole person, with the lawyer “helping clients articulate and actual-
ize their values through the law.” Id. at 103.
176. Kruse, Engaged Client-Centered Representation, supra note 174, at 587.
177. Id. (quoting STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL
ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 7 (2009)).
178. Id. (citing ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 177, at 6–7, 23).
179. See id. at 589.
180. See id.  Kruse does encourage lawyers to “prob[e] beneath the surface of the
client’s stated wishes to ensure that what the client says he wants is consistent with the
client’s other values and to ensure that the decisions made by the client in the mo-
ment will stand the test of time as the client’s situation changes.”  Kruse, Engaged
Client-Centered Representation, supra note 174, at 588.
181. See Kruse, Challenge of Moral Pluralism, supra note 174, at 421–22 (discussing
Luban).
182. See id. at 421, 426–33 (discussing Simon).
183. Id. at 421, 433–40; see infra Part III.B (discussing the friendship analogy as
employed in the work of Fried, Kronman, Shaffer, and Cochran).
184. Kruse, Challenge of Moral Pluralism, supra note 174, at 421.
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another.  This friendship analogy has been relied upon for a variety of
purposes, such as seeking to resolve the ethical tensions for lawyers
existing under the standard conception of the lawyer’s role; guiding
lawyers in giving advice to clients; or criticizing the morality of the
standard conception.
1. Fried and Kronman
“Can a good lawyer be a good person?”185  In a much-discussed
1976 article186 and in subsequent scholarship,187 Charles Fried has
posed this fundamental ethical question188 to set the stage for his vig-
orous defense of the “moral status of the traditional conception of the
professional.”189  He answers the question “yes” by analogizing client-
lawyer relations to friendship.190  In particular, Fried describes the
lawyer as “a friend [to the client] in regard to the legal system,” who
“enters into a personal relation” with the client and not only acts in
the client’s interests, but also “adopts [those interests] as his own.”191
In doing so, the lawyer accepts an obligation to ensure “the client’s
autonomy within the law,”192 which is a morally worthy endeavor
within our “generally just and decent” legal order.193
According to Fried, when acting in legal friendship, the lawyer
“may work the system for his client even if the system then works
injustice.”194  Provided the lawyer does not “engage his own person in
doing personal harm to another” (e.g., by lying, cheating, humiliating,
or similarly abusive behavior), Fried asserts the lawyer is not morally
culpable for any wrongs done to others by the client either directly or
through the legal system as used to advantage by the client.195  Fried
sees the moral independence of lawyers as being reflected by their
185. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976) [hereinafter Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend].
186. Id.
187. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 189–93 (1978) [hereinafter FRIED,
RIGHT AND WRONG] (chapter entitled “Doing Harm in a Justifiable Role”).
188. See Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 311, 312 n.5 (1990) (“This, of course, is the question that is truly at the heart
of the moral inquiry into the ethics of lawyers.”); see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Chris-
tian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics, 33 MERCER L. REV. 877, 880 (1982)
(considering the good lawyer/good person question through an analysis of the charac-
ter of Atticus Finch in the screenplay of the 1962 film To Kill a Mockingbird); McGin-
niss, supra note 7, at 24–25.
189. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, supra note 185, at 1065.
190. Id. at 1071.
191. Id.; see also FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 187, at 180 (“I believe the
analogy to friendship is illuminating because, as in the case of friendship, an ultimate
legal and moral discretion to enter into these relations and show loyalty within them
must be allowed.”).
192. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, supra note 185, at 1073.
193. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 187, at 192–93.
194. Id.
195. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, supra note 185, at 1082–86.
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freedoms in the selection of practice and of clients:  “The lawyer’s lib-
erty—moral liberty—to take up what kind of practice he chooses and
to take up or decline what clients he will is an aspect of the moral
liberty of self to enter into personal relations freely.”196  With regard
to lawyers in the advising role, even though Fried adheres to the prin-
ciple of nonaccountability,197 he insists lawyers may (and should)
freely counsel clients about moral issues relating to the
representation:
[I]t is no part of my argument to hold that a lawyer must assume
that the client is not a decent, moral person, has no desire to fulfill
his moral obligations, and is asking only what is the minimum that
he must do to stay within the law. On the contrary, to assume this
about anyone is itself a form of immorality because it is a form of
disrespect between persons. . . . It would be absurd to contend that
the lawyer must abstain from giving advice that takes account of the
client’s moral duties and his presumed desire to fulfill them.  In-
deed, in these situations the lawyer experiences the very special sat-
isfaction of assisting the client not only to realize his autonomy
within the law, but also to realize his status as a moral being.198
In The Lost Lawyer,199 Anthony Kronman develops his own version
of a friendship analogy for client-lawyer relations, but with substantial
differences from Fried as to both the meaning and the purpose of the
analogy.200  Kronman contends that a lawyer’s ability to combine sym-
pathy and detachment as an advisor is analogous to friendship, as
friends “often exercise a large degree of independent judgment in as-
sessing each other’s interests,” and “[w]hat makes such independence
possible is the ability of friends to exercise greater detachment when
reflecting on each other’s needs than they are often able to achieve
when reflecting on their own.”201  According to Kronman, the good
196. Id. at 1078.  The friendship analogy serves as support for Fried’s client selec-
tion thesis because there is a “picture of purely discretionary choice implicit in the
notion of friendship.” Id. According to Fried, “the individual lawyer does a morally
worthy thing whomever he serves and, moreover, is bound to follow through once he
has begun to serve.” Id.
197. See supra notes 36–41, 156 and accompanying text.
198. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, supra note 185, at 1088.
199. KRONMAN, supra note 67; see also discussion supra note 68 and accompanying
text (addressing Kronman’s view of sympathy and detachment in the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment).
200. KRONMAN, supra note 67, at 131–32.
201. Id. In elaborating on what it means for a lawyer to combine “sympathy and
detachment,” Kronman points to Aristotle’s ethics:
To put the point in Aristotelian terms, friendship exists in a mean between
sympathy and detachment, and requires their combination in third-personal
deliberation.  The same is true of the lawyer’s relation to impetuous clients,
and this is why in such cases his role may be properly analogized to that of a
friend (not, as some have claimed [citing Fried] because he is prepared to
stand by his client no matter what, uncritically making the client’s cause his
own).
Id. at 132.
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lawyer will deliberate well, exhibiting the virtue of “practical wisdom”
in advising clients about the ends to be achieved in the representation
and the means by which they are to be achieved:
In all these cases—of impetuosity, conflict, vagueness, and self-
doubt—lawyers must regularly do something that the narrow view
ignores.  They must deliberate, for and with their clients, about the
wisdom of their clients’ ends, as opposed simply to supplying them
with the legal means for realizing their desires. . . .  To perform this
part of his job competently, a lawyer needs more than technical
knowledge.  He needs practical wisdom as well.  And to have this he
must possess certain traits of character, for it is in these that practi-
cal wisdom consists.202
Fried and Kronman have each acknowledged the shortcomings of
the friendship analogy for client-lawyer relations, including the lack of
reciprocity as to duties and interests and the typical arrangement for
compensation for legal services to clients.203  Moreover, Fried’s more
extensive reliance on the analogy as moral justification for a lawyer’s
actions on behalf of clients has elicited substantial criticism, not only
as to the reasonableness of the analogy,204 but also as to the harms to
other persons205 and to society206 it may be construed to justify.
202. Id. at 133–34. A lawyer’s cultivation and exercise of the virtue of practical
wisdom is a professional goal that Kronman calls the “lawyer-statesman” ideal. Id. at
16–17 (“The ideal of the lawyer-statesman was an ideal of character.  This meant that
as one moved toward it, one became not just an accomplished technician but a distinc-
tive and estimable type of human being—a person of practical wisdom.”).  Robert F.
Cochran, Jr. has criticized Kronman’s “notion of practical wisdom” because, unlike
Aristotle, “he isolates [it] from the other virtues.”  Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers
and Virtues, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 707, 718 (1996) (book review).  As Cochran
points out, in Aristotle’s virtue ethics, “practical wisdom is the ability to put moral
virtues to good use.” Id.
203. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 187, at 179 (“Professional relations are
one-sided in ways that friendship should not be, since the client owes no reciprocal
loyalty to his doctor or lawyer.”); KRONMAN, supra note 67, at 132 (“The lawyer-
client relation . . . is not reciprocal—the client is not expected to take an interest in his
lawyer’s affairs, as the lawyer is in his—nor do friends generally pay each other for
their advice.”).
204. See, e.g., Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen Leff, Correspondence, The Lawyer
as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 579 (1977) (suggesting that, in Fried’s analysis, “[a] law-
yer is a person who . . . will attempt to forward or protect the interests of a client,
within the rules of a legal system, so long as he is paid a sufficient amount to do so,
and so long as doing so does not inflict any material unforeseen personal costs.  That’s
‘friendship’?”); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 180 (1993) (“Fried forgets the elements of time and interwoven iden-
tity that bind friends together and makes friendship plausible.”).
205. For example, Michael K. McChrystal has argued “[t]he celebration of auton-
omy suggested by [Fried’s] argument reflects a moral priority that is unjustifiable,
particularly when it permits one to willfully harm another for purely selfish reasons by
conduct that Fried asserts is itself morally wrongful.”  McChrystal, supra note 161, at
394. Although McChrystal does “allow that personal autonomy within the limits of
the law is a positive moral value,” he emphasizes that this allowance “is a far cry from
assigning it the highest moral value, more valuable even than life itself.” Id.
“[D]espite its shortcomings,” he concludes, “Fried’s analysis . . . is valuable in identi-
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2. Shaffer and Cochran
Over the past several decades, Thomas L. Shaffer207 and Robert F.
Cochran, Jr.208  have published joint209 and individual scholarship in
which they have sought to deepen legal ethics’ understanding of the
meaning of “relationship” between client and lawyer.  In doing so,
they have relied extensively on the traditional Aristotelian concept of
friendship as being a collaboration in the good.210  In the 2009 second
edition of their highly influential law school textbook Lawyers, Cli-
ents, and Moral Responsibility, Shaffer and Cochran explain the
framework for the ideals they are promoting, as well as the frame-
work’s limitations as applied to contemporary law practice:
The model we advance for the lawyer who is concerned with the
goodness of the client is the lawyer as friend. . . .  We are not sug-
gesting that the lawyer can become a friend to every client.  We use
friendship as a metaphor. . . .  Our argument is that the lawyer
should raise moral issues with the client in the way that good friends
deal with moral issues, neither ignoring them nor imposing their val-
ues on the friend, but raising them as matters for discussion. . . .  In
[twentieth-century Jewish philosopher] Martin Buber’s terms, a
friend treats the other as a “thou” rather than an “it.”211
fying the client’s dignity and autonomy under the law as one source of the lawyer’s
moral obligation to be loyal.” Id.
206. FLETCHER, supra note 204, at 180 (criticizing what he describes as Fried’s
“model of voluntary contract” for client selection and relations, and asserting “if law-
yers are merely selling their services, they have no more claim to be a calling or pro-
fession than do butchers, bakers, and candlestick makers”).
207. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, A Lesson from Trollope for Counselors at Law,
35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 727, 733–35 (1978) (introducing the friendship analogy);
Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319,
329–30 (1987) [hereinafter Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client]; Thomas L.
Shaffer, “Technical” Defenses: Ethics, Morals, and the Lawyer as Friend, 14 CLINICAL
L. REV. 337, 337, 350–53 (2007) [hereinafter Shaffer, “Technical” Defenses].
208. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Enlightenment Liberalism, Lawyers, and the
Future of Lawyer-Client Relations, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 685, 690–91 (2011) [herein-
after Cochran, The Future of Lawyer-Client Relations]; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The
Rule of Law(yers), 65 MO. L. REV. 571, 593–94 (2000) (book review); Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from Dostoyev-
sky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 327, 333–34 (1998); see also COCHRAN ET AL., A COLLABORA-
TIVE APPROACH, supra note 165, at 8.
209. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLI-
ENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter SHAFFER & COCHRAN,
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY].
210. See, e.g., id. at 46–47; see also ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 115 (3d ed. 2008)
(contrasting the “traditional idea of friendship,” in which the friends’ “useful[ness] to
one another” and shared “commitment to the good” are prominent, with our contem-
porary emphasis on friends being persons who “enjoy one another’s company”).
211. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at 46–47; see
MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU 15 (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 2d ed., Charles
Scribner’s Sons 1958) (1923) (explaining the nature of an “I-Thou” relationship is
“mutual,” because “[m]y Thou affects me, as I affect it”).  As Shaffer has acknowl-
edged, however, Buber “despaired of professional relationships.  He thought it was all
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Shaffer has long advocated an “ethics of care” for lawyers as their
basic orientation in “talking with a client about what is to be done.”212
According to Shaffer, an ethics of care “denies that lawyer and client
are moral islands,” but instead admits that “the law-office conversa-
tion is moral and that those who speak to one another in law offices
are interdependent and at risk.”213  It also “aspires to moral discourse
as an exercise of love,” and “make[s] conscience” relevant as the law-
yer and client “influence one another.”214
Cochran, writing with others215 as well as in his individually au-
thored work,216 has relied upon elements of the friendship analogy in
advocating a “collaborative approach” to advising clients.217  The goal
of this approach is for the client to “control decisions,” but for the
lawyer to “structure the process and provide advice in a manner that
is likely to yield wise decisions.”218  Directing attention to Kronman’s
friendship analogy in The Lost Lawyer (i.e., balancing sympathy and
detachment as a friend might),219 Cochran highlights the importance
of “practical wisdom” in advising clients, and further emphasizes that
the collaborative counseling endeavor is “not merely a matter of the
lawyer exercising practical reason,” but also “a matter of enabling the
client to exercise practical reason.”220
Shaffer and Cochran have acknowledged that among the reasons
“moral discourse may be difficult is the potential difference in moral
values between lawyer and client,” even when they may adhere to
similar religious traditions or share a common cultural background.221
but impossible for a professional in the modern world to look at his client and see a
Thou rather than an It,” because “the sides are too unequal.  The situation is not only
difficult, Buber said—it is tragic.”  Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, supra
note 207, at 319–20 (citing MARTIN BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN: A PHILOSO-
PHY OF THE INTERHUMAN 171–72 (Maurice Friedman ed., Maurice Friedman & Ron-
ald Gregor Smith trans., 1965)).
212. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, supra note 8, at 21–22.
Shaffer contrasts the “ethics of care” orientation with two alternatives: (1) role orien-
tation, which is governed by “an idea about the function in society of the legal profes-
sion, and the function of a lawyer in the profession”; and (2) moral isolation, which is
governed by “the idea that the law-office conversation is one in which moral positions
are asserted and either accepted or rejected.” Id.
213. Id. at 22.
214. Id.
215. COCHRAN ET AL., A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH, supra note 167, at 6–9.
216. Cochran, The Future of Lawyer-Client Relations, supra note 208, at 690–91.
217. See COCHRAN ET AL., A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH, supra note 167, at 6–9.
218. Id. at 6.
219. Id.; see supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Kronman’s friendship analogy).
220. COCHRAN ET AL., A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH, supra note 167, at 7.
221. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at 52.  Noting
that “[e]ven among the vast majority of those within North America who identify
themselves as Jewish or Christian, there are differences in belief about moral and
social values,” they point out that nevertheless “there is more commonality in
America than this perception [of difference] suggests—enough, we believe, for moral
discourse between lawyers and the clients to be possible and fruitful.” Id. at 52 (citing
C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 95–121 (1947) and JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
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To meet this challenge, they suggest lawyers should seek with their
clients to identify areas of moral common ground—such as the moral
values of “justice,” “mercy,” and “truthfulness.”222  They urge lawyers
to see their differences in moral values with their clients not merely as
obstacles, but as opportunities:
To the extent that lawyer and client share moral values, there is a
greater likelihood of understanding.  We find it easiest to discuss
moral problems with those with whom we share a common tradi-
tion—the lawyer and client can point to common norms and exem-
plars.  But moral insight often comes from conversation with
someone who sees a problem from a different point of view. Diver-
sity in values creates problems, but it also creates opportunities.223
Cochran has also observed raising moral concerns with a client may
often proceed simply by asking questions—such as “What will be [the]
effect on other people?” or “What would be fair?”—calling on clients
“to draw on their own sources of moral values.”224
From the time it was introduced, Shaffer and Cochran’s “lawyer as
friend” model for client-lawyer relations has elicited vigorous schol-
arly criticism.  Shortly after the 1994 release of the first edition of
Lawyers, Clients, and Moral Responsibility, Jack L. Sammons pub-
lished an article offering a sympathetic but pointed rejoinder to the
friendship analogy.225  In his article, Sammons criticizes Shaffer and
Cochran’s reliance on Aristotle, whose teleological account of friend-
ship depends heavily on a shared morality226 too uncommon in our
“society of strangers”227 for their model to succeed consistently in
contemporary law practice.228
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 83–84 (1980) as “cataloguing many moral values that are
shared by different cultures”).
222. Id. at 52–53.
223. Id.; see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its
Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 305, 315 (2000) (observing that “our religious and other
moral traditions provide far more than ‘personal’ values,” as “[t]hey draw on memo-
ries, stories, virtues, and rules that have their source beyond living memory; they have
evolved over long periods of time, based on the wisdom of many that have gone
before”).
224. Cochran, The Future of Lawyer-Client Relations, supra note 208, at 692.
225. See Jack L. Sammons, Rank Strangers to Me: Shaffer and Cochran’s Friendship
Model of Moral Counseling in the Law Office, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1995).
226. See id. at 22 (“For Aristotle, the sharing of moral values between character-
friends is not a chance event and it is not a matter of just living in the same communi-
ties.  Character-friends can share moral values because both were morally formed in a
polis whose primary business is moral formation.”).
227. Id. at 11, 27, 40.  Sammons alludes to Alasdair MacIntyre’s assessment of
American culture in AFTER VIRTUE, which Shaffer and Cochran acknowledge with-
out dispute. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at
47 (citing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 156 (2d ed. 1984)).
228. See Sammons, supra note 225, at 20–27.  As Sammons explains, “To attempt
moral counseling of strangers as if they were not so, as if any friendships with them
based on shared morals were possible, is surely to court moral failure.” Id. at 27.
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For Sammons, when a lawyer relates to this client who comes “as [a]
stranger,”229 the “relevant integrity” for the lawyer is found in adopt-
ing the role of “rhetorician,” as “one who is called upon to speak per-
suasively for another within the legal culture.”230  To prepare to “re-
present” the client to others, as a story, the “rhetorician” lawyer
should explore with the client “who she is and what it means to be
who she is in this dispute in these communities with these values.”231
In this process, “the rhetorician discovers and creates—creates be-
cause the conversation will change the client—who the client is and
what is to be said for her,” because the client must see the dispute “as
rhetorical.”232  Importantly to Sammons, it is the client—not the law-
yer—who is “the source of whatever wisdom the lawyer as rhetorician
will speak.”233  Such a lawyer will explore the client’s “connection
with others, as Shaffer and Cochran would have them do for good-
ness’s sake.”234  Ultimately, however, the purpose of such conversa-
tions is not to “move” clients to what the lawyer believes to be “moral
commonalities” shared between them, as with friends; instead, the
purpose is principally a pragmatic one: the lawyer “cannot speak per-
suasively for [the client] in any other way.”235
More recently, Katherine R. Kruse has argued that in a morally plu-
ralistic society, the “lawyer as friend” model poses unacceptable risks
that advising lawyers will “impose” their moral values on clients,236
and may impair both the availability and, in some cases, the quality of
legal representation.237  Shaffer and Cochran responded to Sam-
mons’238 and Kruse’s239 critiques, seeking to clarify and refine their
moral counseling model to address the concerns expressed.  For exam-
229. Id. at 44.
230. Id. In fact, Sammons goes so far as to say that “speaking persuasively for
strangers is the most legitimate source of the morals we bring to moral counseling.”
Id. at 44–45.
231. Id. at 49, 51.
232. Id. at 49.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 50.
235. Id.
236. See Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients, supra note 174, at 137–38.
237. See Kruse, Challenge of Moral Pluralism, supra note 174, at 434–41; see also
Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 493,
504–05 (2011) (“When a lawyer takes on the goal of morally educating the client or
making the client a better person through moral conversation, the problems of lack of
moral expertise, risk of moral overreaching, and threat to rule-of-law values arise.”).
238. Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers as Strangers and
Friends: A Reply to Professor Sammons, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 69, 69–70
(1995) [hereinafter Shaffer & Cochran, Reply to Professor Sammons].  To Sammons’
Aristotelian critique, they respond in part by underscoring their use of friendship as
an “analogy” seeking to capture “the combination of moral responsibility, respect for
client dignity, and moral discourse that should be part of the lawyer-client relation-
ship.” Id. at 70.
239. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at 40–41,
45, 63, 91–92.
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ple, to respond to concerns about risks of domination and imposition,
they have recently emphasized that when the lawyer has reason to
believe there are substantial differences with the client on moral val-
ues, it becomes most critical to make “the moral values of the client
the focus of the discourse.”240  Nevertheless, legal ethics has continued
the search for new word-concepts, other than “friendship,” to express
a morally engaged vision of a lawyer’s role as an advisor to clients.  In
the next section, this Article will depict an ideal for the advising law-
yer to serve as a “trustworthy neighbor” to the client.
C. The Lawyer as Trustworthy Neighbor
In many respects, Sammons’ portrait of the “lawyer as rhetorician”
is an appealing one. Here, the lawyer listens to the client and seeks to
understand the client, in the fullness of human character and concerns
(including moral values), and prepares to “speak” the client to
others.241  Yet the lawyer begins as, and remains to the very end, a
“stranger” to the client whose story is told.242  In Martin Buber’s ex-
pression, relationally the client remains an “It,” not a “Thou,” to the
lawyer.243  According to Sammons, the advising lawyer should influ-
ence the client only to the extent the lawyer helps the client see the
legal situation in rhetorical terms (i.e., as the client’s story).244  The
lawyer may exhibit technical skill as a rhetorician in learning the cli-
ent’s story and telling it, but the moral relationship remains essentially
detached and objective, not sympathetic and subjective.245  For those
seeking a deeper vision of what it means professionally and personally
to relate to another human being as an advisor on the law, I suggest a
more subjective ideal—that of the lawyer as a “trustworthy neigh-
bor”—to be more meaningful and, in the possibilities for the exercise
of virtue it creates, more fruitful.
1. Trustworthy
The concept of “trustworthiness” on which I will rely is well intro-
duced by Robert K. Vischer’s discussion of trust in Martin Luther
King Jr. and the Morality of Legal Practice: Lessons in Love and Jus-
240. See id. at 57.
241. Sammons, supra note 225, at 49.
242. Id. at 7.  Sammons also uses the expression “rank stranger,” alluding to the
gospel song “Rank Strangers to Me,” originally recorded by Albert E. Brumley and
covered by Bob Dylan. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
209, at 7 n.28 (citing BOB DYLAN, DOWN IN THE GROOVE (Columbia Records, 1988)).
243. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
244. See Sammons, supra note 225, at 52 (“The way good lawyers, as rhetoricians,
move their clients in their disputes . . . is toward seeing their disputes with a rhetorical
eye.”).
245. As Shaffer and Cochran express it in their reply to Sammons, for the lawyer as
rhetorician “morals come into the conversation as a matter of technique.”  Shaffer &
Cochran, Reply to Professor Sammons, supra note 238, at 82.
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tice.246  “Trust,” Vischer observes, “as a willingness to make one’s self
vulnerable to another, is relational.”247  However, contemporary
trends such as globalization, the disaggregation of legal services, and
economic and sociological shifts in law firm culture, have placed rela-
tional trust with clients under increasing pressure.248  The net effect of
these trends has been to move the legal profession in a significant way
“from a paradigm of ‘trusting in’ to ‘trusting that.’”249  That is, rather
than offering to clients as the lawyer’s distinctive professional service
a “thickness” of relationship allowing them to trust “in” a lawyer, the
new paradigm marginalizes “noneconomic values” and asks clients
“only to trust ‘that’ a lawyer will not act contrary to the client’s inter-
ests in a specific scenario.”250  While recognizing the obstacles
presented by the multiple external forces impinging on them and their
clients, lawyers should embrace a renewed ethos of subjectively deep-
ening (i.e., “thickening”) their advising relationships with clients
where and when they can.251  Only then is a genuine “trust in” rela-
tionship, with its good fruits, made possible:
The client must trust that the attorney has the client’s best interests
at heart, and that widening the conversation to encompass consider-
ations beyond the narrowly technical need not invariably function
as an entryway for the attorney’s self-interest. The attorney must
trust the client enough to listen authentically, to step beyond her
own assumptions long enough to encounter the client as a moral
subject, and to question whether her own perspective accurately re-
flects the client’s best interests. A “thick” attorney-client relation-
ship requires mutual trust because approaching the other as a
subject requires mutual vulnerability.252
As preparation for establishing “trust in” relationships with cli-
ents,253 a lawyer must form a professional identity that embraces a
246. VISCHER, MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 103–40.
247. Id. at 107.
248. See id. at 108–31.
249. Id. at 132.
250. Id.; see also Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1725–26 (2006) (referring to “trust that” trust as “trust as
prediction,” as compared with “trust in” trust in a person, and noting that a lawyer’s
violation of “trust that” standards are generally enforced by various forms of positive
law, such as ethics codes and civil and criminal liability).
251. See VISCHER, MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 133.
252. Id.
253. Although institutional clients may present special challenges for the lawyer
engaged in moral counseling, see, e.g., id. at 115–18, there is always a “real human
relationship” involved, “whether the client is an actual person or an organization
managed by, and created to serve the interests of, actual persons.” Id. at 148; see also
SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at 57–61 (discussing
challenges lawyers who represent corporations and lawyers who practice in law firms
may face when engaged in moral counseling).
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first-personal understanding of the self as a moral “subject.”254  In
light of the prevalence and influence of self-and-other objectifying
ideology in the legal profession, including the standard conception of
the lawyer’s role255 and the principle of nonaccountability,256 making
this leap of understanding may not be an easy task.  But only then is
the lawyer best equipped to receive second-personal knowledge257 of
the client as a fellow moral “subject,” and to relate to (and care for)
the client as such.258
It is also essential for the advising lawyer to exhibit a virtuous char-
acter recognizable by clients and others as “trustworthy.”  Trustwor-
thiness is an essentially “subjective” human quality, distinct in
character from other more objective, largely technique-oriented at-
tributes of a good lawyer, such as competence and diligence, or even
dependability and reliability.259  Moreover, because life in the profes-
sion creates numerous occasions for a lawyer to experience tempta-
tions and pressures to depart from virtue, the lawyer’s exercise of
moral independence is vital to the quality of trustworthiness.  Finally,
there is an important role that the legal profession as a whole may
fulfill in promoting clients’ willingness to recognize and accept their
own lawyer as trustworthy, by shaping expectations through the
messages it communicates about professional role and identity.260
The fruits of a client-lawyer advising relationship grounded in per-
sonal trust spring from the prospect of mutuality, whereby two mor-
ally independent subjects become, as Thomas L. Shaffer has said,
254. See VISCHER, MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 28; see also
supra Part II.C.3 (discussing Kierkegaardian “subjectivity”).
255. See supra Part III.A.
256. See supra notes 36–41, 156 and accompanying text.
257. Anthony Rudd describes “second-personal knowledge” as involving “recog-
nizing the other as someone who has a unique first-personal perspective of his or her
own,” so that “the first-personal remains crucial.” RUDD, SELF, NARRATIVE, &
VALUE, supra note 24, at 52; see also id. at 55 (“An important part of getting to know
another person is getting to learn what interests that person, what matters to him or
her. . . .  [I]f you want to know someone, you need to know what he or she takes as a
reason for doing something.”).
258. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing Shaffer’s “ethics of care”).
259. Writing about business ethics, Michael Josephson has described trustworthi-
ness as “the crown jewel of personal ethics,” and opined “[t]o be worthy of trust is
among the highest achievements of a good life.”  Michael Josephson, Trustworthiness
and Integrity: What It Takes and Why It’s So Hard, BUS. ETHICS & LEADERSHIP (Jan.
7, 2011), http://josephsoninstitute.org/business/blog/2011/01/trustworthiness-and-integ
rity-what-it-takes-and-why-it%E2%80%99s-so-hard/.  Trustworthiness consists of
“four major qualities: integrity, honesty, promise-keeping, and loyalty.” Id. Its sub-
jectivity is reflected not only by its personal value and impact (as trust makes “mean-
ingful human connection” and causes “great pain” when betrayed), but also by its
being intertwined with one’s whole life. See id. As Josephson notes, “The moral duty
enshrined by the concept of trust is not to be trusted by another (that is someone
else’s decision) or to trust another (although this act of faith is often critical to mean-
ingful intimate relationships).  Rather, the ethical obligation is to live one’s life so as to
be worthy of trust.” Id. (emphasis added).
260. See VISCHER, MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 145–46.
2013] VIRTUE AND ADVICE 41
“interdependent and at risk.”261  The lawyer and client are willing to
“depend on” and “influence” each other.262  As in the friendship
model, the lawyer aspires to “care for the client and to be cared for”
by the client.263  The existence of personal trust makes authentic
moral conversation possible, with the client exercising the freedom to
engage and learn from the lawyer as one who has at heart the client’s
best interests, which is best understood as embracing the client’s
“good.”264  For lawyers, the concept of authenticity involves “living
consistently with one’s deepest values and core beliefs”265 (i.e., being
“true to” one’s self), but also implies the quality of candor (i.e., mani-
festing the truth about one’s self in communications with others).  A
client who “trusts in” a lawyer, and in the lawyer’s commitment to
serve the client’s good,266 will be more inclined to be fully candid in
communicating with the lawyer, including on matters of moral con-
cern, as one human subject to another.267
2. Neighbor
On the basis of what moral principle might an advising lawyer find
the inspiration to develop subject-to-subject professional relationships
characterized by personal trust and an ethics of care?  As a source of
261. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, supra note 8, at 22.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Although Shaffer advocates the “lawyer as friend” moral counseling model, he
has explained client autonomy in a manner consistent with my proposed ideal of the
lawyer as “trustworthy neighbor”:
[T]he goal of autonomy does not preclude deep moral conversation.  This is
to say that there is a difference between freedom and isolation.  The aspira-
tion to autonomy assumes moral conversation because it assumes that moral
decisions are important and that none of us makes his moral decisions alone.
Autonomy (etymologically rule-of-self) assumes a certain amount of inde-
pendence, but it is not an ethics of isolation.  As Gerald Dworkin puts it,
autonomy is independence plus authenticity.
Id. at 25; see Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Behavior Control, HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT, Feb. 1976, at 23, 24 (“[A]utonomy = authenticity + independence.  The au-
tonomous person is one who does his own thing.  So we need characterizations of
what it is for a motivation to be his, and what it is for it to be his own.  The first is
what I shall call authenticity; the second, independence.”).
265. Daisy Hurst Floyd, The Authentic Lawyer: Merging the Personal and the Pro-
fessional, in ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 19, 20 (Paul A.
Haskins ed., 2013).
266. See DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 47 (“It is only through a more adequate un-
derstanding of notions such as tradition, authority, commitment, and loyalty, and of
the forms of human community in which these have their roots, that we shall be able
to develop a conception of autonomy free from paradox and worthy of admiration.”).
267. The lawyer as “trustworthy neighbor” will not lose sight of the “lived” subjec-
tivity of the client. See SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, supra note
8, at 25 (“The risk of openness is a risk involving the person of the client, and accept-
ance of the principle (and of the fact) that even in ‘representation’ it is not only an
argument or interest being asserted, but a person and a relationship being not as-
serted, but lived.”) (emphasis added).
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wisdom in this search, Vischer looks to the Christian faith and moral
philosophy of Martin Luther King Jr.268  The recognition of human
dignity was an “animating value” for King’s ministry, and Vischer
cites many public statements and writings of King establishing that the
Biblical principle of agape—sacrificial love269—was the “vehicle” by
which the value of human dignity operated in King’s everyday
work.270
A lawyer who loves is more than a rhetorician, and “cares about the
client in a way that does not presume to equate the client’s well-being
with the maximization of her independence and autonomy.”271
Agapic love is based upon a commitment to the well-being of another,
without regard to one’s own emotions, preferences, or interests.272  It
calls for lawyers to think and act in accordance with their “social na-
ture” by embracing their human “accountability to the good of the
client.”273  This “good of the client” includes a commitment by the
lawyer to refrain from, purposely or not, becoming the occasion for
the client to experience avoidable deformation of moral character
through the actions taken to address the client’s legal situation.274
The lawyer following this path will aspire to recognize, and love, the
client as a “neighbor.”275  In engaging the client as a “neighbor,” and
as a “subject,”276 the lawyer should also encourage the client to see
the persons with whom they have disputes in a similar light.277  In
practice, this means the lawyer should not lose sight of the client’s
268. See VISCHER, MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2.
269. “Agape is the term used in the Bible to denote sacrificial love, in contrast to
phileo, which focuses more on the lover’s feelings for another, rather than on how the
lover can meet the other’s needs.” Id. at 83 (citing John 21:15–17 (NIV)).
270. Id. at 81.
271. Id. at 81–82.
272. Id. at 82–91.
273. Id. at 28.
274. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at 46
(stating a lawyer concerned with client goodness will be “concerned with the person
the client is becoming as the client is, inevitably, influencing and being influenced by
the lawyer”); see also JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER’S CALLING: CHRISTIAN
FAITH AND LEGAL PRACTICE 97 (1996) (stating “the lawyer has a personal moral
obligation not to let a lawsuit degenerate into bitterness and revenge,” and “[i]f she
refuses to play petty games of harassment . . . and declines to project all the evil in the
world upon her opponent, then her client will be more likely to accept something less
than the complete and utter destruction of the other party”).
275. See Matthew 22:39 (ESV) (“You shall love your neighbor as yourself.”); see
also MICHAEL P. SCHUTT, REDEEMING LAW: CHRISTIAN CALLING AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 53 (2007) (discussing how the Christian lawyer can serve as an instru-
ment of God’s love to “neighbor clients”).
276. As with trustworthiness, a lawyer’s knowing the other-client as “subject” and
“neighbor” requires first knowing one’s self as a “subject.” See VISCHER, MORALITY
OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 28 (observing “a lawyer who aspires to agape
will need to rediscover—or discover for the first time—her own status as a moral
subject”).
277. Id. at 166–67.
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being within the “human community,”278 and should promote and re-
inforce this understanding with the client.
Writing in his own voice,279 in Works of Love280 Søren Kierkegaard
offers deliberations and discourses on the Christian concept of agape
as the love of one’s “neighbor.”281  For Kierkegaard, the distinctive
character of neighbor love is that rather than being founded on one’s
preferences or inclinations, it is commanded and, at the same time, is a
“matter of conscience.”282  Moreover, as C. Stephen Evans explains,
Kierkegaard’s Works of Love283 contrasts Socratic concepts of moral
independence with the dynamic relationship of independence and in-
terdependence found in neighbor love:
The major difference between the Socratic and Christian maieu-
tic[284] in Works of Love revolves around the concept of “neighbor
love,” the distinctively Christian kind of love.  When Socrates has
helped the other, he can take a certain ironic satisfaction in observ-
ing the other stand alone—with his help. This satisfaction is bound
up with Socrates’ own independence. The Christian maieuticist, on
the other hand, is bound to the one helped in a way Socrates was
not.  For the Christian both the one who is helped as well as he
278. Id. at 167.
279. For an excellent discussion of Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms in some of his
works and not others, and the reasons for these decisions, see EVANS, KIERKEGAARD:
AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 125, at 24–45.
280. SøREN KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong
eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1995) (1847) [hereinafter KIERKEGAARD, WORKS
OF LOVE].
281. See id. at 44–90 (three chapters on aspects of Christian “neighbor love,” and
the instruction “You Shall Love the Neighbor”).
282. See M. Jamie Ferreira, “The Problematic Agapeistic Ideal—Again,” in ETHICS,
LOVE, AND FAITH IN KIERKEGAARD 92, 102–03 (Edward F. Mooney ed., 2008) (citing
KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE, supra note 280, at 140).  Ferreira explains how
Kierkegaard “describes the commanded love of neighbor as one in which we affirm
the other’s distinctiveness, help the other to be independent, forgive and seek recon-
ciliation—all because we acknowledge the other as equal in created ‘kinship.’” Id. at
102 (footnote omitted).  “Loving the other’s distinctiveness, for example, is explained
by Kierkegaard by contrast with the domineering and controlling attitudes that do not
respect the other as an equal before God.” Id.
283. See KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE, supra note 280, at 276–79.
284. In reference to Socrates, the “maieutic” ideal is “the view that each person has
the truth within and it is the task of the communicator to be a ‘midwife’ who helps the
other give birth to his or her own truth.” EVANS, KIERKEGAARD: AN INTRODUCTION,
supra note 125, at 43.  Kierkegaard is also committed to this ideal, at least with respect
to what he calls “ethical communication,” with the use of indirect communication
(including pseudonyms), because it “deeply respects the autonomy of human persons
and their responsibility as individuals to grasp the truth, at least the truth about life,
for themselves.” Id. at 43–44; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing Socratic recollec-
tion).  On the other hand, with respect to “ethical-religious communication” and
Christianity, Kierkegaard insists “direct-indirect” communication is needed, combin-
ing indirect means (such as his pseudonymous writings) for promoting the recipient’s
“capability” (the condition for receiving truth) with a direct “witness or testimony
about Christ” (e.g., the non-pseudonymous religious discourses). EVANS, KIERKE-
GAARD: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 125, at 45.
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himself stand alone—with God’s help. The helper and the one
helped are independent of each other but totally dependent on God.
In thus sharing a total dependence on God’s love they are bound
together in a way.  This binding does not compromise their indepen-
dence of each other.285
Socratic independence, with its ethical ideal of self-knowledge and
individual virtue, and Christian independence, with its spiritual ideal
of mutual dependence on God,286 share an essential feature: an under-
standing that moral character is an eternal good with a value that ex-
ists beyond material calculation.287  Whether following a Socratic or a
Christian path, lawyers should aspire to an ethic of care that deeply
values moral goodness,288 both within themselves and, as their words
and conduct may have an influence upon them, within their “neigh-
bor” clients.289  Self-known as a trustworthy neighbor, the lawyer un-
285. EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS AND POSTSCRIPT, supra note 132, at
109–10 (emphases added); see also C. STEPHEN EVANS, Who is the Other in The Sick-
ness Unto Death?, in KIERKEGAARD ON FAITH AND THE SELF: COLLECTED ESSAYS
263, 274 (2006) (“In neighbor love, God is always present as the ‘third’ or ‘middle-
term.’”).
286. See C. STEPHEN EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S ETHIC OF LOVE: DIVINE COM-
MANDS & MORAL OBLIGATIONS 151–52 (2004) [hereinafter EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S
ETHIC OF LOVE] (discussing Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christian autonomy and
independence through mutual dependence on God).  For Kierkegaard, another im-
portant “[p]art of the independence given by neighbour-love consists in the freedom
from the need for reciprocation,” and thus “protects against the unhealthy kind of
dependence on another.” Id.
287. “[Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author Johannes] Climacus, like Socrates, sees
moral goodness as ‘the pearl of great price,’ a good for which all other goods, includ-
ing even such significant goods as health and length of life, must be sacrificed if neces-
sary.” Id. at 102; see also Matthew 13:45–46 (ESV) (Jesus’ Parable of the Pearl).
288. In terms resonant with meaning for lawyers, virtue ethics, and the advising of
clients, Evans explains a deciding self’s focus on “moral goodness” (i.e., virtue) is not
a form of selfishness:
The ethical agent can and should have a concern for the well-being of others.
However, in estimating how others might be helped, the development of moral
character is again the preeminent factor. There are strict limits on our ability
to help another person develop such character, since ultimately a person’s
character is formed by his or her own choices. . . .  However, within those
limits it is still true that the highest thing one person can do for another is
encourage the development of character.
EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S ETHIC OF LOVE, supra note 286, at 102 (emphases added);
see also McGinniss, supra note 7, at 46 (explaining why first-personal ethical decision
making, as a component of virtue ethics for lawyers, is “neither selfish nor self-
centered”).
289. Kierkegaard emphasizes that Christian love of neighbor “makes no distinc-
tions” and “loves all equally.” KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE, supra note 280, at
60, 269–73.  Does this mean the lawyer’s special relationship with the client does not
justify the lawyer preferring (or caring for) the client’s good more than the good of
other persons?  In discussing the challenge posed for Kierkegaard’s “no distinctions”
concept of neighbor love by the existence of “special relations,” such as marriage and
friendship, Evans helpfully suggests that Kierkegaard “means that we must not ‘make
distinctions’ in the sense that we exclude some people from the scope of our moral
concern.” EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S ETHIC OF LOVE, supra note 286, at 205–06.  “But
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derstands relations with the client not as friendship, but instead in a
way that is both more accessible in our “society of strangers” and
more protective of and receptive to the client’s own moral indepen-
dence.  The lawyer loves and respects the client as a neighbor in need
who should be served in a manner worthy of trust, and who possesses
an essential dignity and personality deserving of the lawyer’s devotion
of time, energy, and counsel.
Vischer poignantly describes King’s understanding of agape and
love of neighbor in terms resonant for lawyers and their moral respon-
sibilities in advising clients:
We act as subjects in willing love toward the neighbor based on our
personal recognition and response to her worth and her needs.  We
also acknowledge the neighbor as a subject, not as an object. . . .  If
the object of our love is a subject in her own right, our love must not
be paternalistic or infantilizing; it must reflect an authentic and re-
spectful human encounter. In loving his neighbor—friend or foe,
black or white—King was a subject, investing himself in the neigh-
bor in order to see the world through the neighbor’s eyes, but insist-
ing that the neighbor expand her view to encompass a truer, less
isolated vision of her own well-being.290
Lawyers, too, should invest themselves in their clients, subject-to-sub-
ject and neighbor-to-neighbor, and seek their clients’ good in the pur-
suit of justice.291
IV. SOCRATES AND MORAL DIALOGUE: SOME LESSONS
FOR LAWYERS
Socrates was a philosopher, and did not practice or profess exper-
tise about the positive law.  And he lived in a world far removed from
our own in both time and culture.  But along with his exhibiting the
quality of moral independence, the study of Socrates also offers the
lawyers of today intriguing insights into moral dialogue with clients.
This is not meant to suggest that lawyers adopt with clients Socrates’
predominant method of philosophical inquiry, known as “elenchus”292
loving my neighbour in this sense does not mean that there are not also special rela-
tions that provide a basis for treating some individuals differently from others, even if
I must try to love all of them.” Id. at 206; see also M. JAMIE FERREIRA, LOVE’S
GRATEFUL STRIVING: A COMMENTARY ON KIERKEGAARD’S WORKS OF LOVE 53–64
(2008).
290. See VISCHER, MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 90–91.
291. See id. at 309 (noting that King “practice[ed] love in the service of justice,” and
lived for others “not in some sense of noble self-denial, but in the stark recognition
that ‘the self cannot be self without other selves’”) (quoting Martin Luther King Jr.,
“Where Do We Go from Here?,” in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRIT-
INGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 245, 252 (James M. Washington
ed., 1986)).
292. “In its standard form [elenchus] is a type of adversative argument in which
Socrates refutes a thesis p, defended by the interlocutor as his personal belief, by
eliciting from him additional premises, say {q,r}, whose conjunction entails the nega-
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(though it is noteworthy that some of the elenchus “rules” might have
valuable application to client-lawyer dialogue).293  Instead, this Article
proposes that certain attributes of Socrates’ thought and character, as
reflected in his dialogues, may be helpful for effectively reaching
across the divide between lawyer and client and promoting fruitful
moral conversations.
A. Socratic Ignorance: Lawyer Modesty in Moral
Dialogue with a Client
Socrates is well-known for his frequent claims to be ignorant of the
truth, and lacking in wisdom.294  In defending himself at trial, he pro-
claims to the jury, “I am only too conscious that I have no claim to
wisdom, great or small.”295  Significantly, however, Socrates also be-
lieves recognizing his own limitations is itself a crucial form of moral
knowledge: in describing his relationship with one of his dialogue
partners, he reflects that “[i]t is only too likely that neither of us has
any knowledge to boast of, but . . . it seems that I am wiser than he is
to this small extent, that I do not think that I know what I do not
know.”296  In this vein, Socrates interprets the words attributed to the
tion of p.” VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER, supra note 28,
at 266.  “The refutation is accomplished by ‘peirastic’ argument: the refutand p, pro-
posed and defended by the interlocutor, is refuted out of his own mouth: p is shown to
be inconsistent with propositions in his own belief-system.” Id. at 266 (footnote
omitted).
293. “[T]here are rules dictating what the participants in the [elenchus] inquiry can
and cannot do: (1) the respondent cannot hide behind hypotheticals, (2) the ques-
tioner cannot force the respondent to accept something he does not really believe, [and]
(3) the respondent has the freedom to make whatever modifications he wishes pro-
vided that he remains consistent with himself.” KENNETH SEESKIN, DIALOGUE AND
DISCOVERY: A STUDY IN SOCRATIC METHOD 37 (1987) (emphasis added).  For law-
yer-questioners and client-respondents, the second and emphasized rule resonates
with the importance a lawyer should place on a client’s intellectual and moral
freedom.
294. In describing his role as one who lacks knowledge, but could lead others to the
truth, Socrates invoked images of childbirth, with him serving as the “midwife”:
Heaven constrains me to serve as a midwife, but has debarred me from giv-
ing birth.  So of myself I have no sort of wisdom, nor has any discovery ever
been born to me as the child of my soul.  Those who frequent my company at
first appear, some of them, quite unintelligent, but, as we go further with our
discussions, all who are favored by heaven make progress at a rate that
seems surprising to others as well as to themselves, although it is clear that
they have never learned anything from me.  The many admirable truths they
bring to birth have been discovered by themselves from within.  But the de-
livery is heaven’s work and mine.
PLATO, Theatetus, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 845, 855
(150c-d) (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., F. M. Cornford trans., Princeton
Univ. Press 1961).
295. Apology, supra note 15, at 3, 7 (21b).
296. Id. at 8 (21d).  For an argument that Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge is sin-
cere, but also that paradoxically Socrates claimed to possess some types of moral
knowledge, leading to an uncertainty/certainty categorization that promotes genuine
dialogue, see Daniel A. Grano, The Means of Ignorance: Genuine Dialogue and a
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oracle of Delphi (asserting that Socrates was “the wisest man in the
world”)297 as based upon Socrates’ realization that “in respect of wis-
dom he is really worthless.”298  In this realization, he is (ironically)
truly wise.299
Despite these Socratic assertions of ignorance, scholars have long
pointed to other evidence indicating his claims of limitation were not
absolute in nature.300  For the purposes of this Article and for what
lawyers engaged in moral dialogue can learn from Socrates, it is not
necessary to resolve that debate.  What is most significant for the ad-
vising lawyer is Socrates’ example of modesty as to his possession of
moral knowledge, combined with a persistent dedication to pursuing
such knowledge in conversation with his dialogue partners.  For law-
yers, Socratic ignorance ultimately pertains more to mindset than to
method.301
In the Gorgias, Socrates asks, “[W]hat kind of a man am I?  One of
those who would gladly be refuted if anything I say is not true, and
would gladly refute another who says what is not true, but would be
no less happy to be refuted myself than to refute, for I consider that a
Rhetoric of Virtue 102-34 (Aug. 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana
State Univ.), available at http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-0528103-095224/unre
stricted/Grano_dis.pdf.
297. Apology, supra note 15, at 3, 7 (21a).
298. Id. at 9 (23b).
299. According to Socrates, “real wisdom is the property of God.” Id. at 9 (23a).
As Paul Johnson has said, “Socrates believed in God.  It was precisely because he
believed in God that he devoted his life to philosophy, which to him was about the
human desire to carry out divine purposes.” JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 106.
300. For example, Richard Bett concludes that through his claims of ignorance Soc-
rates did not “take himself to lack all ethical knowledge,” but rather to lack a “sys-
tematic understanding” of the definitions of ethical properties and qualities, such as
justice and courage. Richard Bett, Socratic Ignorance, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPAN-
ION TO SOCRATES 215, 220–24 (Donald R. Morrison ed., 2011).  As Gregory Vlastos
further explains:
To resolve the paradox [of Socrates’ “disavowal of knowledge”] we need
only suppose that he is making a dual use of his words for knowing.  When
declaring that he knows absolutely nothing he is referring to that very strong
sense in which philosophers had used them before and would go on using
them long after—where one says one knows only when one is claiming cer-
tainty.  This would leave him free to admit that he does have moral knowl-
edge in a radically weaker sense . . . .
GREGORY VLASTOS, SOCRATIC STUDIES 49 (1994) [hereinafter VLASTOS, SOCRATIC
STUDIES].
301. The “Socratic method” has a venerable, though recently controversial, pedi-
gree in the traditions of American legal education.  In assessing its pedagogical merits
and limitations, the concept of Socratic ignorance has also received some attention
from scholars.  For example, Thomas D. Eisele describes the first lesson of Socratic
teaching as disillusion, meaning that “[y]ou don’t know what you think you know.”
THOMAS D. EISELE, BITTER KNOWLEDGE: LEARNING SOCRATIC LESSONS OF DISIL-
LUSION AND RENEWAL 16 (2009).  The second lesson involves leading a law student
through a process of renewal, which is a realization that “[y]ou know more (or other)
than what you think (you know).” Id.; see infra Part IV.B (discussing Socratic
recollection).
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greater benefit . . . .”302  Like Socrates, a good advising lawyer should
be a fully engaged, flexible, and modest participant in moral dialogue
with a client, always prepared to learn and to be changed for the bet-
ter.303  Similar to law teachers in classroom discussions with students,
when lawyers converse with their clients, they should be prepared to
question their own premises and assumptions, adjust their point of
view, and carefully attend to competing values.304
But for a lawyer exercising moral independence and personal con-
science, such questions and adjustments and balancing also have lim-
its.  A lawyer may encounter circumstances where, after the dialogue
has taken place, the client insists upon a course of action the lawyer
steadfastly believes to be immoral, such that the lawyer should with-
draw from representing the client.305  These situations should, how-
ever, occur very infrequently.306  With modesty as to their own
certainty in knowledge and insight into the moral issues involved, ad-
vising lawyers should give the client the benefit of the doubt when
deciding whether to proceed with representation, rather than
withdraw.307
302. Gorgias, supra note 29, at 241 (458a).
303. See VISCHER, MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 93 (“If the
lawyer and client are both subjects, they will act as partners in a moral dialogue,
remaining open to the possibility that their partner in the endeavor may actually teach
them something.”).
304. See James R. Beattie, Jr., Socratic Ignorance: Once More Into the Cave, 105 W.
VA. L. REV. 471, 476, 483 (2003).  As advisors, lawyers educate their clients about the
law, and learn from them as well. See generally Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as
Teacher: The Role of Education in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 359 (1998).  Exer-
cising good teaching and learning skills benefits lawyers in moral dialogue with
clients.
305. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at 63
(“When the lawyer believes that the client wants her to do something that is wrong,
the moral thing for a lawyer to do is what Sir Thomas More did—refuse, decline,
withdraw.”); see also ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962) (play about
the life and death of sixteenth-century lawyer Sir Thomas More); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2013) (permitting a lawyer to terminate representa-
tion if “the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or
with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement”).
306. As Shaffer and Cochran have observed, “Difficult moral issues—the kind that
often arise in the law office—are likely to be issues over which reasonable people
could differ.”  Shaffer & Cochran, Reply to Professor Sammons, supra note 238, at 76.
In most cases, where “[g]ood people might resolve them in different ways,  . . . the
conscientious lawyer (though she might have decided differently than did the client)
will support and work for the client.” Id. at 77; see also SHAFFER & COCHRAN,
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at 62 (explaining “[a] factor that weighs in
favor of the lawyer continuing to represent the client is that the lawyer’s role in speak-
ing for the client . . . empowers the client and helps the community, in the person of
judges and juries, determine a proper result”).
307. Shaffer and Cochran, invoking the example of Sir Thomas More withdrawing
from his role as lawyer for King Henry VIII on grounds of moral conscience, have
emphasized “how radically unusual such a course was for More, [and] how earnestly
he avoided it.” SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at
63.
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B. Socratic Recollection: A Stirring of the Conscience
In the Meno, Socrates claims “seeking and learning are in fact noth-
ing but recollection.”308  As Gregory Vlastos explains, Socrates
“teaches saying he is not teaching. What he says is what he means if to
teach is to impart to a learner truth already known to oneself.”309  Or,
in the words of C. Stephen Evans, “Socrates as teacher is only the
‘occasion’ for the learner’s own self-conscious realization.”310  Al-
though the nuances of Socrates’ (or Plato’s)311 theory of recollection
are complex,312 its essence is straightforward for providing helpful gui-
dance for lawyers in their moral dialogue with clients.  In providing
advice and counseling, the lawyer may become the occasion for the
client’s self-conscious realization about how to resolve a moral
question.
Socratic recollection has drawn attention in recent years from schol-
ars writing about law teaching and pedagogy.313  For example, in Bitter
Knowledge: Learning Socratic Lessons of Disillusion and Renewal,
308. Meno, supra note 18, at 364 (81d); see also Republic, supra note 14, at 750
(518b-c) (“[E]ducation is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their
professions.  What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does
not possess it, as if they were inserting vision into blind eyes.”).
309. VLASTOS, SOCRATIC STUDIES, supra note 300, at 65.  Kierkegaard, in the voice
of pseudonym Johannes Climacus, devoted considerable attention to Socratic recol-
lection, and its relation to Christianity:
Here we encounter the difficulty that Socrates calls attention to in the Meno
. . . : a person cannot possibly seek what he knows, and, just as impossibly, he
cannot seek what he does not know, for what he knows he cannot seek, since
he knows it, and what he does not know he cannot seek, because, after all,
he does not even know what he is supposed to seek.  Socrates thinks through
the difficulty by means [of the principle] that all learning and seeking are but
recollecting.  Thus the ignorant person merely needs to be reminded in or-
der, by himself, to call to mind what he knows. The truth is not introduced to
him but was in him.
KIERKEGAARD, PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS, supra note 126, at 9 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted); cf. RUDD, LIMITS OF THE ETHICAL, supra note 7, at 159 (noting
that for Kierkegaard, “Socrates is merely the occasion by which the learner is brought
to realize the truth that is within him, whereas Christ brings from outside us the truth
that we do not have”).
310. EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS AND POSTSCRIPT, supra note 132, at 109.
311. Prominent classical scholars have voiced doubts it was Socrates, rather than
Plato, who adhered to “a grandiose metaphysical theory of ‘separately existing’ Forms
and of a separable soul which learns by ‘recollecting’ pieces of its pre-natal fund of
knowledge.” VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER, supra note
28, at 48; see also JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 93–97 (citing Vlastos for “ten key ways
in which the real Socrates differed from the artificial creation labeled Socrates who
increasingly figures in Plato’s works,” including the Republic).
312. See generally EISELE, supra note 301, at 111–22; Rowe, supra note 89, at
202–03; SEESKIN, supra note 293, at 107–10 (discussing Socrates’ theory of
recollection).
313. See, e.g., Beattie, supra note 304, at 476 (“What teachers can do for their stu-
dents is to get them to recognize explicitly what they already know implicitly.  Rather
than transferring information to our students, we should elicit information from them;
information, which in some significant sense, they already possess.”).
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Thomas D. Eisele applies Socrates’ claim about recollection to the law
school classroom, “understanding it as a figure of speech meant to
capture the sense and extent to which our knowledge of any matter
comes from the human activity of reconstructing or recapturing it
from our own experience.”314  Socrates’ invitation “to recollect some-
thing that we already know—in the sense that we are already familiar
with it, although we do not yet understand it—is a call to make our-
selves aware of something.  We are not yet as conscious as we should
be.”315  In essence, Socrates’ theory of recollection conceives of
human beings as knowers “in need of coming to our senses.”316
In a lawyer’s advising relationship with a client, it may be the law-
yer’s conscience317 that must first be awakened, so as to recognize and
grasp the moral issue to discuss with the client.318  Or the recognition
of the moral issue may begin with the stirring of the client’s con-
science, awakened to the point that the client seeks the lawyer’s coun-
sel as to how the moral issue should be addressed.  However the
moral conversation is initiated, for its outcome to be fruitful the advis-
ing lawyer should understand the need to help the client “recollect”
the values and convictions that form the client’s identity independent
of the legal situation.  This recollection may result in an adherence to
those values and convictions, or in changes to the client’s moral per-
spective through the process of dialogue with the lawyer and, perhaps,
also with other persons the client trusts.  Whatever the outcome may
be, the client will have been afforded the best opportunity to make a
conscious choice about how to apply moral values to the law.  But if
this dialogue does not take place, these clients risk becoming disen-
gaged from who they were, are, or aspire to be as moral subjects,319
free of the legal dispute (or potential one) now weighing upon them
and influencing their decisions about how they will live.  Although a
lawyer can assist a client in this process of recollection—for example,
by asking good questions and thoughtfully exploring moral values as
relevant—the lawyer should also remember that it is the client who
must recall.320
314. EISELE, supra note 301, at 113.
315. Id. at 115.
316. Id.
317. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (discussing the Rules’ preamble on
“personal conscience”).
318. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at 67–68,
72–78 (identifying “moral sensitivity”—i.e., “recognizing the moral issues”—as one of
four elements of a framework for moral discourse between lawyers and clients, along
with “client engagement,” “moral judgment,” and “moral motivation”).
319. See supra notes 253–58 and accompanying text (discussing lawyers and clients
as moral subjects).
320. Cf. EVANS, KIERKEGAARD’S FRAGMENTS AND POSTSCRIPT, supra note 132, at
103 (“[T]he true communicator recognizes the necessity to distance himself from the
receiver, to help the receiver to grasp the truth on his own.”).
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C. Socratic Candor and Care: Truth and Justice
in the Client-Lawyer Relationship
The Socrates we meet in Plato’s dialogues is a candid conversation-
alist, though prone to cloaking his candor in a guise of irony.321  The
special quality of Socrates’ candor is revealed in his frankness about
his own limitations,322 in his genuineness in thirsting for truth,323 and
in his persistent desire for completeness in understanding the word-
concepts whose meaning is at stake in the dialogues.324  Socrates also
insists on reciprocity of candor from his dialogue partners.325
It is, moreover, essential of Socrates that the guise of irony and the
sharp wit he displays in the dialogues do not detract from his care for
the good of those who join with him in conversation.326  He cares for
them as fellow subjects, selves, and souls,327 who join with him to seek
321. See supra note 28 (Vlastos on Socratic irony) and notes 127–32 (Kierkegaard,
and his interpreter Evans, on Socratic irony).  Vlastos strongly criticizes Kierke-
gaard’s suggestion in The Concept of Irony that Socrates “allows himself deceit as a
debating tactic,” and is “the anti-sophist who by ironies of sophistry tricks sophists
into truth.” VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER, supra note 28,
at 42–43.  Vlastos cites Socrates’ statement in the Gorgias about being “refuted,”
supra note 302 and accompanying text, and asks: “[I]f Socrates would rather lose than
win the argument when the truth is on the other side, what could he stand to gain by
slipping in a false premise or a sophistical inference?” VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRONIST
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER, supra note 28, at 43.
322. See supra Part IV.A (discussing Socratic ignorance).
323. To Socrates, dialogue “was a conversation in which people discover one an-
other, and each discovers himself, and each seeks the true and the good.” SHAFFER,
ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, supra note 8, at 30.
324. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text (discussing Socrates and his ex-
ploration of the meaning of word-concepts such as “justice,” “wisdom,” “courage,”
and “temperance”).
325. See supra note 29 (citing the Gorgias and identifying “frankness” (candor) as
one of the three Socratic conditions for genuine dialogue on matters of consequence);
see also Rowe, supra note 89, at 203–04 (describing as a “feature of Socratic conversa-
tion, the demand that the interlocutor should always say what he thinks”); VLASTOS,
SOCRATIC STUDIES, supra note 300, at 7 (describing this as the “say what you believe”
requirement).
326. In the Apology, Socrates reminds his fellow Athenians how he has shown his
care through conversation: “[I] spend all my time going about trying to persuade you
. . . to make your first and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your possessions,
but for the highest welfare of your souls . . . .” Apology, supra note 15, at 16 (29e-
30b). Eisele has called attention to Socrates’ understanding the value of conversation
as a means of caring for one’s self as well:
In the Protagoras, we see Socrates argue for treating conversation as the
preferred way to care philosophically for our soul, or our self.  Food for the
soul—which I take to include self-knowledge as well as knowledge of others
and of the world—is to be gained by means of conversing with people and
examining them, asking them who they are and what they can teach us, what
we can learn from them.
EISELE, supra note 301, at 195–96. See generally PLATO, Protagoras, reprinted in THE
COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 308 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds.,
W. C. Guthrie trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1961) [hereinafter Protagoras].
327. See Protagoras, supra note 326, at 313 (313c) (asked by Hippocrates, “[W]hat
is it that nourishes a soul?,” Socrates replies, “What it learns. . . .”); see also Mooney,
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knowledge of virtue.328  And as Socrates regards justice as the highest
of the virtues,329 seeking knowledge of justice is the greatest of tasks,
and being just is the greatest of ends.330
So, too, for clients and their lawyers, candor and care should be the
means and the motivation for eliciting an engaged moral dialogue re-
lating to the client’s legal situation.  Candor allows the moral issues to
be discussed openly, rather than remaining veiled and affecting the
decisions and conduct of either person without the knowledge of the
other.331  Dialogue undertaken in a spirit of care does not impose the
lawyer’s view of the moral issues on the client,332 nor does it impose
the client’s view on the lawyer.333  Rather, dialogue holds the promise
of making both lawyer and client interdependent and open to benefi-
cial influence334 in the mutual pursuit of what is truly the client’s best
in the legal situation, which includes placing emphasis on the question,
“What is just?”335  A dialogue in a spirit of care also preserves for
supra note 142, at 5 (“Socrates addresses individuals in their specific need, blindness,
evasion, and confusion.”).
328. See Meno, supra note 18, at 371–84 (86a-100c) (in which Socrates inquires af-
ter the question, “What is virtue?”).
329. See supra Part II.C.1 & II.C.2 (discussing “justice” in the Apology and the
Crito); see also VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER, supra note
28, at 209–13 (discussing Socrates’ principle of the “Sovereignty of Virtue,” and the
primary of “justice” as the measure of decision).  Vlastos explains this Socratic princi-
ple in terms of our perception of the good: “Whenever we must choose between ex-
clusive and exhaustive alternatives which we have come to perceive as, respectively,
just and unjust or, more generally, as virtuous and vicious, this very perception of
them should decide our choice. . . .” VLASTOS, SOCRATES: IRONIST AND MORAL PHI-
LOSOPHER, supra note 28, at 210–11.  For Socrates, “[v]irtue being the sovereign good
in our domain of value, its claim upon us is always final.” Id. at 211.
330. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 176 (“The supreme lesson of Socrates’ life . . .
is that doing justice according to the best of your knowledge gives you a degree of
courage that no inbred or trained valor could possibly equal.”).
331. “A lawyer who offers moral advice is no more compromising client autonomy
than one who offers purely legal advice.  In fact, a lawyer who thinks about such
concerns but does not discuss them may, perhaps even unconsciously, manipulate his
client’s actions more problematically than a lawyer who fosters an open dialogue.”
Gantt, Integration as Integrity, supra note 81, at 239–40 (citing Peter Margulies, “Who
Are You to Tell Me That?”: Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues
and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213, 248–49 (1990)).
332. “Agape does not impose, but it cannot shirk from proposing a course of con-
duct that reflects cognizance of the client’s nature and extralegal commitments.”
VISCHER, MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 295.
333. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 209, at 28–29
(explaining “[h]ired gun lawyers . . . play a role, a role that controls their moral
choices” and “run the risk that their moral sensitivity will atrophy”).
334. “Moral discourse in professional relationships does not require that either
party consciously change; it is possible for two people to discuss an issue of con-
science, and to discuss it deeply, even though neither of them comes to change his
mind . . . .  However, the assumption of moral discourse is that each of the discoursers
is open to change.” SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, supra note 8,
at 28.
335. “Justice asks, Have you done right by this person?” VISCHER, MORALITY OF
LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 297.  The question “What is just?” is not an ab-
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both lawyer and client their subjective moral independence, consisting
of their freedom to live as their best selves with integrity and in a
manner consistent with their own good conscience.
V. CONCLUSION
Rule 2.1 establishes professional norms for legal advice, including
the exercise of independent judgment and expectations of candor, but
it also leaves room for the lawyer to exercise moral independence in
deciding the substance of the advice to be rendered.  A lawyer’s can-
did advice on moral considerations invites clients to engage in first-
personal examination of their identity and values, and of how deci-
sions made in the course of legal representation flow from and are
impacted by that identity and those values.  Ideally, but almost para-
doxically, the client should make this self-examination both indepen-
dently of and interdependently with the legal situation and the
persons involved in it, including the advising lawyer.  The legal situa-
tion is the occasion for the self-examination: but it does not define the
client as a person.  Nor do merely the decisions the client makes pro-
vide such definition.336  Rather, it is the moral self that is formed
before, during, and after the representation that defines the client as a
person. As the lawyer provides legal advice and engages the client
from a moral perspective, the lawyer has the occasion to exercise in-
dependence from the client, but also for the client, and the client’s
good.
stract inquiry, but instead considers the client’s specific circumstances, including the
client’s poverty. See, e.g., Shaffer, “Technical” Defenses, supra note 207, at 347 (sug-
gesting that “in cases where the client has been taken advantage of—especially in
cases where the client’s economic class has been taken advantage of—the lawyer’s
moral advice may involve encouraging the client to stand up for himself”).
336. See SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS & THEIR COMMUNITIES, supra note 1, at
16–17 (“Deep down, a person is not just a chooser. There are things about persons . . .
that are more interesting than the choices they make, or the sum of all the choices
they have made.”).
